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I. INTRODUCTION

Congress enacted law in 1989 and 1993, known as Stark, to prohibit physician
self-referral. Self-referral is the referral of patients by a physician to a health care
entity in which the physician has a financial interest. There was concern that the

physician may place more weight on fmancial gain than on the best medical care for

the patient. To counter this possible abuse, the government passed complicated
legislation and regulations.
This paper describes the Stark I and II legislation and regulations (collectively known
as "Stark"). 3 Congress enacted Stark in respbnse to a growing and serious suspicion

of fraud in government health care programs, which many believe was a significant
cause of excessive health care spending. 4 First, the paper describes the premise

underlying Stark including, analytical studies that show a correlation between selfreferral and increased cost, the promulgation of ethical guidelines prohibiting self-

referral, and the failure of other federal laws to prevent fraudulent self-referral
schemes. Next, the paper presents a number of concerns and unintended

consequences caused by the complexity of Stark and the law’s adverse impact on the

The prohibition against physician self-referral is a subset of health care fraud and abuse law. This
paper does not specifically address fee splitting with other professionals, anti-kickback, false claims, or
any other type or kind of health care fraud and abuse.
2
See Generally, BARRY R. FURROW g’r AL., HEALTH LAW (3d ed. 1997); BA_V,RY R. FUPdOW ET AL.,
HEALTH LAW HORNBOOK (1995).
Stark I and II are codified at 42 U.S.C. 1395nn and attached as an Appendix.
4
The estimated cost caused by self-referrals was $28 million to the Medicare program in 1989. The
projected costs from increased utilization were expected to be $103 million in 1995. Operation Restore
Trust was introduced in 1995 to fight health care fraud in, and to recover health care dollars from, abuse
in four of the most vulnerable areas: home health care, nursing facilities, durable medical equipment,
and hospice care. This initiative now operates in 24 states and recovers $23 for every $1 it spends on
enforcement. RICHARD P. KUSSEROW. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS
BETWEEN PHYSICIANS AND HEALTH CARE BUSINESSES: REPORT TO CONGRESS (1989).

health care environment. Because of these concerns and unintended consequences,
the Department of Health and Human Services proposed Stark H regulations and

Congress proposed two new legislative initiatives. After analyzing these proposals,
this paper concludes with an akernative proposal.
See, Jo-Ellyn Sakowitz Klein, The Stark Laws: Conquering Physician Conflicts ofInterest? 87 GEO.
L. J. 499 (1998).

I1. SUPPORT FOR THE PROHIBITION ON SELF-REFERRAL

Congress promulgated the Stark prohibition on self-referral, and then expanded
the prohibition through Stark II, in response to a growing a__nd documented suspicion

that physicians were increasing heath care costs by profiting from the self-referral of

patients. Three grounds supported the government’s suspicion of fraud. First, results
of analytic studies showed a correlation between physicians referring patients to their
own businesses and increased cost. Second, ethical guidelines prohibiting self-referral

documemed the medical profession’s consensus that self-referral was a problem.

Third, the government realized that the anti-kickback statute might not prohibit
fraudulem self-referral arrangements.

A. Studies from professional literature
More than a dozen studies published in professional literature and other
sources starting in 1989 concluded that self-referrals are a common occurrence and

appear to be very costly. These studies found a correlation between self-referral and
increased cost. Because these studies formed a major basis for introduction and

expansion of laws prohibiting self-referral, six of these studies are briefly outlined
here.

Congress mandated that the OIG conduct a study on physician ownership of,
and compensation from, health care emities to which the physician makes referrals.
The results of the OIG study were published in 1989 and formed a major basis for the

promulgation of Stark I. 6 Of the 2690 physicians who responded to the survey, 12%

had an ownership interest and 8% had a compensation arrangement with the facility to
which they referred. Further, based on HCFA Medicare data files regarding

responding physicians’ utilization, 25% of independent clinical laboratories, 27% of
independent physiological laboratories, and 8% of durable medical equipment
suppliers were owned in some part or in whole by referring physicians. Patiems
referred to facilities in which the physician had an ownership or financial interest
received 45% more clinical laboratory services and 34% more independem clinical

laboratory services than patients in general.

A 1990 study published in the New England Journal of Medicine studied the
frequency and use of diagnostic imaging for physicians with in-office equipment as

compared to physicians who referred patients to outside facilities. 7 The study
concluded that the physicians with in-office equipment ordered imaging four to fourand-a-half times more often than physicians who referred to outside facilities. The

study also found that the charges were higher for in-office imaging. Imerestingly, this
study found that the differences could not be attributed to the patient population,
specialties of the physician, or the complexity of the imaging procedures performed.

A 1992 study by the same investigators extended and confirmed the 1990
research. The 1992 study concluded that physicians who owned imaging technology

employed diagnostic imaging in their evaluation significantly more often and
This study and the subsequent studies are considered to be a major basis for the expansion of Stark
and the promulgation of Stark II.
8
Bruce J. Hillman et al. Frequency and Costs ofDiagnostic lmaging In Office Practice -A
Comparison OfSelf-Referring and Radiologist-Referring Physicians. 323 N. E. J. M. 1604 (1990).

generated higher imaging charges than did physicians who referred to independent

radiologists. 9
The Florida Health Care Cost Containment Board .published its findings on

self-referral in

1991.1

The Board studied access, cost, utilization, and quality. The

study found that 93% of diagnostic imaging facilities in Florida were joint ventures
with physicians. When compared with non-physician affiliated facilities, doctor-

affiliated clinical laboratories, diagnostic imaging facilities, and physical therapy
facilities performed more procedures on a per-patiem basis, charged higher prices, and
were not located in under-served areas.

The New England Journal of Medicine published a study in 1992 that assessed
utilization of physical therapy, psychiatric evaluation, and magnetic resonance

imaging (M). 11 The study concluded that self-referring physicians initiated physical

therapy more than two times more often than the non-referring group, but the cost per
visit was lower for the self-referring group. Doctors referred psychiatric patiems in

the self-referral group for more visits per patient than the non-referral group, thus

yielding significantly higher (26%) costs for psychiatric evaluation services in the selfreferral group. Self-referring physicians ordered

scans about 10% more often

than physicians making referrals to a facility in which they had no financial
arrangement, with no significam difference in cost. The study concluded that self-

referral increased costs in three ways: by increasing the number of patiems receiving
9

Bruce J. Hillman et al. Physicians’ Utilization and Charges for Outpatient Diagnostic Imaging in a
Medicare Population. 268 JAMA 2050 (1992).
0

STATE OF FLORIDA HEALTH CARE COST CONTAINMENT BOARD, JOINT VENTURES AMONG HEALTH
CAR PgOvlDrtS IN FLORIDA. September, 1991.

physical therapy, by increasing the number of psychiatric evaluations performed
without increasing the number of patiems, and by increasing the frequency of requests

for MRI scans.
Another 1992 study published in the Journal of the American Medical
Association concluded that physical therapy and rehabilitation facilities owned by

referring physicians resulted in higher utilization, per patient charges, and revenue per

patient. Joint venture physical therapy clinics performed fifty percent more visits per

year than non-joint venture clinics, including forty-five percent more visits per patient
resulting in thirty-two percent more revenue per patient, even with significantly lower

per visit costs. Joint venture physical therapy clinic staff spent significantly less time
with patients and substituted unlicensed therapists to perform physical therapy more

often. Also, joint venture facilities generated more revenue from patients with private

insurance, rather than Medicare or Medicaid. Results for rehabilitation facilities
owned by referring physicians were similar. 2
The General Accounting Office published an analysis of 2.4 million
13
diagnostic-imaging services ordered by 17,900 physicians in the state of Florida.

The study concluded that physicians with a financial interest in the diagnostic imaging
service produced higher referral rates than physicians without a financial interest. The

study further found that the disparity between referral rates was greater for more costly
services. Also, physicians with in-office imaging facilities referred more frequently
11

Alex Swedlow et al. Increased Costs and Rates of Use in the California Workers’ Compensation
System as a Result ofSelf-Referral by Physicians. 327 N.E.J.M. 1502 (1992).
12
Jean M. Mitchell and Elton Scott. Physician Ownership ofPhysical Therapy Services: Effects on
Charges, Utilization, Profits, and Service Characteristics. 268 JAMA 2055 (1992).

(two to five times more often, depending on the service) than those physicians
required to refer to an outside facility.

Although these studies provide support for the law to prohibit physicians from
referring patients to emities in which they have a business interest, the studies may not
be sufficiem to draw such a firm conclusion. There is no direct proof that the
increased services provided to patients were unnecessary, only that patients were

referred to facilities where a physician had an ownership or financial imerest more
often than patiems of physicians who had no ownership or financial imerest. It is
unknown whether the items ordered were medical necessary. Further, it is unknown
whether the patients received better care because of the self-referral. The studies

generally do not eliminate or accoum for confounding factors that may have
influenced a physician to use more services, such as sickness of the patient population
or physician familiarity or proximity with the service. Generally, these studies do not

determine directly the extem to which financial incentives are responsible for costly
over-utilization or unnecessary care. They merely suggest a correlation between self-

referral and increased utilization or cost. Based on these deficiencies, further research
is needed to determine whether the prohibition on self-referral actually comrols over-

utilization caused by physician self-referral. Nonetheless, these studies provided a
strong rationale for the govemmem’s intervention into medical practices to prohibit

self-referral.
13

GAO REPORT. MEDICARE" REFERRALS TO PHYSICIAN-OWNED IMAGING FACILITIES WARRANT
HCFA’s SCRUTINY. No. B-253835, October, 1994.

B. Professional Ethics
The prohibition against the referral of patients to an entity in which the

referring physician has a financial interest is often based on the ethical principals of
the Hippocratic Oath and the fiduciary duty arising from the physician-patiem

relationship.
The Hippocratic Oath requires each physician to protect patiems from harm
and injustice. If a physician’s referral is motivated by economic gain there is a
violation of this Hippocratic principle and aconflict of imerest. A patient might be

subjected to unnecessary medical tests and costs based on the physician’s financial
gain rather than the best imerests of the patiem.
The conflict of interest created by self-r6ferral also violates a professional

fidelity or loyalty that exists between physician and patient. The professional fidelity
or loyalty gives the patiem’s imerests priority.

14

Ethical principles require that self-

imerest be eliminated in any conflict, with the patiem’s imerests taking priority over

others’ interests. Changes in the American health care system have created conflicts
of fidelity and loyalty in many areas, including areas where physicians have a
financial or business imerest in the care they render. Physicians have always been

paid for their services, but corporate arrangemems have not always existed where the

opportunity was so readily available for the financial interests of the physician to
override the best imerests of the patiem. The physician’s fidelity to the patient is

threatened because referral to emities that are self-owned can lead to the provision of

unnecessary or unnecessarily expensive care. "A divided loyaky can only be
reconciled by giving up or seriously modifying one or more of the conflicting

loyalties. ’’5 Most commentators agree that "avoidance of self-referral should not be
considered an option, but rather a firm obligation of fidelity and a necessary condition

of moral integrity." 16

Accordingly, professional medical organizations have adopted ethical

principles to reconcile the divided loyalties inherent with self-referral. These

principles generally prohibit self-referral, although the adoption of these principles has
been difficult. The development of ethical guidelines by the profession has guided
lawmakers as they created laws prohibiting self-referral. 17 Guidelines developed by
the American Medical Association, the American College of Radiology, the American

College of Physicians, and the American Occupational Therapy Association are given
as examples.

Initially, the American Medical Association (AMA) refused to prohibit self-

referrals. 18 Eventually, the AMA issued ethical guidelines rendering it unethical for

physicians to refer a patient to a health care facility outside of their office practice at
which they do not directly provide care or services, but in which they have an
investment interest. The AMA guidelines allow a physician to refer to such a facility
14

See generally, TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 431

et seq. (4t ed. 1994).
5
Id
16

17

Id"

See also, Paul W. Armstrong and Virginia M. Hughes, BME.Defines Public Policy in Physician SelfReferral, 94 N. J. MED. 49 (1997)(outlining the New Jersey Board o1" Medical Examiners rule that a
physician may not make a referral for the furnishing of health care services to a health care entity in
which the physician or an immediate amily member has a significant beneficial interest.).
1,
American Medical Association, Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs. Conflicts ofInterest:
Physician Ownership ofMedical Faci#ties. 267 JAMA 2366 (1992).

10

if that physician will actually provide the service to the patient at the facility in which

the physician has an investment or ownership interest or if the facility is needed in the

community and no alternative source is available to provide the service and the
investment interest is disclosed to referred patients. 19 The AMA noted that
19

AM CODE OF ETHICS:

Section 8.03 Conflicts of Interest: Guidelines

Under no circumstances may physicians place their own financial interests above the welfare of their
patients. The primary objective ofthe medical profession is to render service to humanity; reward or
financial gain is a subordinate consideration. For a physician unnecessarily to hospitalize a patient,
prescribe a drug, or conduct diagnostic tests for the physician’s financial benefit is unethical. If a
conflict develops between the physician’s financial interest and the physician’s responsibilities to the
patient, the conflict must be resolved to the patient’s benefit.
Section 8.032 Conflicts of Interest: Health Facility Ownership by a Physician

Physician ownership interests in commercial ventures can provide important benefits in patient care.
Physicians are free to enter lawfifl contractual relationships, including the acquisition of ownership
interests in health facilities, products, or equipment. However, when physicians refer patients to
facilities in which they have an ovenership interest, a potential conflict of interest exists. In general,
physicians should not refer patients to a health care facility which is outside their office practice and at
which they do not directly provide care or services when they have an investment interest in that
facility. The requ’trement that the physician directly provide the care or services should be interpreted
as commonly understood. The physician needs to have personal involvement with the provision of care
on site.

There may be situations in which a needed facility would not be built if refemng physicians were
prohibited from investing in the facility. Physicians may invest in and refer to an outside facility,
whether or not they provide direct care or services at the facility, if there is a demonstrated need in the
community for the facility and alternative financing is not available. Need might exist when there is no
facility of reasonable quality in the community or when use of existing facilities is onerous for patiems.
Self-referral based on demonstrated need cannot be justified simply if the facility would offer some
marginal improvement over the quality of services in the community..The potential benefits of the
facility should be substantial. The use of existing facilities may be considered onerous when patients
face undue delays in receiving services, delays that compromise the patient’s care or affect the
curability or reversibility ofthe patient’s condition. The requirement that alternative financing not be
available carries a burden of proof. The builder would have to undertake efforts to secure funding from
banks, other financial institutions, and venture capitalists before taming to self-referring physicians.

When there is a true demonstrated need in the community for the facility, the following requiremems
should also be met: (1) physicians should disclose their investment interest to their patients when
malting a referral, provide a list of effective alternative facilities if they are available, inform their
patients that they have free choice to obtain the medical services elsewhere, and fissure their patients
that they will not be treated differently if they do not choose the physician-owned facility; (2)
individuals not in a position to refer patients to the facility should be given a bona fide oppommity to
invest in the facility on the same terms that are offered to referring physicians; (3) the oppommity to
invest and the terms of investment should not be related to the past or expected volume of referrals or
other business generated by the physician investor or owner; (4) there should be no requirement that a

11

"physicians are not simply businesspeople with high standards. Physicians are

engaged in the special calling of healing, and, in that calling, they are the fiduciaries of
their patients. They have different and higher duties than even the most ethical

businessperson.

’’

The American College of Radiology (ACR) holds that self-referral

arrangemems lead to inappropriate utilization of medical services and that no
justification for these arrangements outweighs the risks inherent in the arrangement. 1
The ACR advocates the ethical principle that physicians should not have a direct or
indirect financial interest in facilities to which they refer patients. ACR further does
not agree with the argument that the current trend toward managed care decreases the

need for self-referral prohibitions. Managed care arrangements comain overutilization protections that theoretically would protect patients from unnecessary care
physician investor make referrals to the entity or otherwise generate business as a condition for
remaining an investor; (5) the return on the physician’s investment should be tied to the physician’s
equity in the facility rather than to the volume of referrals; (6) the entity should not loan funds or
guarantee a loan for physicians in a position to refer to the entity; (7) investment contracts should not
include ’noncompetition clauses" that prevent physicians from investing in other facilities; (8) the
physician’s ownership interest should be disclosed to third party payers upon request; (9) an internal
utilization review program should be established to ensure that investing physicians do not exploit their
patients in any way, as by inappropriate or unnecessary utilization; (10) when a physician’s commercial
interest conflicts to the detriment ofthe patient, the physician should make alternative arrangements for
the care of the patient. AMngICAN MDICAL ASSOCIATION. COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL

AFFAIRS. CODE OF MEDICALETrCS (1999).
o
ld.
The practice of physicians referring patients to health care facilities in which they have a financial
interest is riot in the best interest of patients. This practice of self-referral may also serve as an
improper economic incentive for the provision of unnecessary treatment or services. Even the
appearance of such conflicts or incentives can compromise professional integrity. Disclosing refemng
physicians’ investment interests to patients or implementing other affirmative procedure to reduce, but
not completely eliminate, the potential for abuse created by self-referral is not sufficient... The
American College or Radiology believes that radiologists and radiation oncologists should make efforts
to restructure the ownership interests in existing imaging or radiation therapy facilities because selfreferral may improperly influence the professional judgments of those physicians referring patients to
such facilities. Medicare Physician Referral Laws. Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Health of
the House Committee on Ways andMeans. 1999 WL 304843 (1999)(statement of J. Bruce Hauser,
M.D., FACR, on behalf of American College of Radiology).

12

caused by physician profit motives. However, over 80% of Medicare beneficiaries
still belonged to fee-for-service care as of 1998 and the health care environment has
not shifted enough to eliminate the costs of self-referral.

The American College of Physicians requires the physician seek to ensure that

medically appropriate levels of care take primacy over financial considerations.
Physicians should not refer patients to an outside facility in which they invest and at
which they do not directly provide care. Physicians, may, however, invest in or own

health care facilities when capital funding and necessary services are provided that

would otherwise not be available. In such situations, in addition to disclosing these
interests to patients, safeguards must be established to protect against abuse,

impropriety, or the appearance of impropriety. :
The American Occupational Therapy Association believes that the act of

referral does not constitute an ethically reimbursable professional service because the

responsibility of health care professionals is to place the health care needs of patients
first. A financial relationship creates a potential conflict of interest; an economic

inducemem that can result in referrals when services are not needed or referrals for a
wider range of services or greater frequency and longer duration of treatmem than is

actually necessary. 23
22

American College of Physicians, Ethics Manual: Fourth Edition, 128 ANNALS OF INTERNAL
MEDICINE 576 (1998).
23
American Occupational Therapy Association, Referral for Profit (White Paper), 44 AM. J. o1
OCCUIATIONAL THERAPY 852 (1990),

13

C. Failure of the Anti-Kickback Statute to Prohibit Self-Referral
The OIG assumed that the Medicare and Medicaid anti-kickback statute would

prohibit self-referral when they notified a physician-corporation owned laboratory
joint venture in 1989 that their self-referral scheme violated the anti-kickback
statute. 4 The anti-kickback statute, which existed prior to Stark, prohibits the

knowing and willful payment, solicitation, or receipt of remuneration in the form of

kickbacks, bribes, or rebates for the referral, or the inducement of a referral, for
services covered by Medicare or Medicaid. s Safe harbors exist to provide immunity

for certain arrangements.

It was clear to the OIG after an adverse administrative

decision in 1989 that the anti-kickback statute would not adequately prohibit self-

referral.
The anti-kickback intent requirement, that the provider have a "knowing and
willful" intent to violate the law, created difficulties in the prosecution of self-referral

under the anti-kickback statute. In Hanlester Network v. Shalala, the government

attempted to prosecute physician partners in a general partnership, The Hanlester
Network ("Hanlester"). Hanlester consisted of corporations and physicians that
24

Hanlester Network v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 1390 (9 Cir. 1995)(note that the enforcement process for this
matter lasted until 1995).
25
42 U.S.C. 1320a-7b(b).
26
Differences between the anti-kickback statute and Stark include: violation of the self-referral law can
only result in denial of payment, civil penalties, and exclusion from federal health care programs, while
violation of the anti-kickback laws can result in criminal felony prosecution and imprisonment of up to
five years, civil sanctions up to $25,000 and exclusion from participation in Medicare and Medicaid;
self-referral laws are said to be seN-enforcing or preventative because the mere existence of a prohibited
relationship is subject to loss of Medicare payment or a civil fme, creating an incentive to comply,
without the necessity of showing intent. Further, the self-referral laws only cover items and services
financed by Medicare and Medicaid, while the anti-kickback laws cover items covered by other
federally financed health programs. In general, anti-kickback is broader than the self-referral law.
27
Hanlester Network v. Shalala, 51 F.3d at 13 90.

14

entered into a laboratory service agreement with SmithKline BioScience Laboratories
to provide management services to all joim vemure laboratories in which Hanlester

had an ownership interest. Hanlester offered limited partnership shares in the joim
venture laboratories. The government attempted to prove that Hanlester violated the

anti-kickback statute by offering and paying remuneration to physician investors to
induce them to refer laboratory tests for Medicare and Medicaid patients to the

laboratories. The govemment also attempted to show that the joim vemure physicians
received paymems in return for referrals and should be excluded from participation in

Medicare and Medicaid. The court held that the OIG had to show that the defendams

specifically knew about the anti-kickback statute and specifically intended to violate
the statute. The court held that substantial evidence did not exist to prove this sciemer

requirement.

Thus, it became clear that it was unrealistic to rely on anti-kickback laws to
control self-referral. The anti-kickback law requires a burden of proof establishing
intent that is difficult to prove. Further, the federal courts have adopted, depending on

jurisdiction, three differem imerpretations of the term "willful. ’’2 Hanlester Network
outlines one of the difficulties with using the ami-kickback laws to enforce self8

Contrast, Hanlester Network v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 1390 (9 Cir. 1995)(holding that to find a violation
ofthe statute, the court must find that the defendant knowingly and willfully engaged in prohibited
conduct with specific intent to disobey the law), U.S.v. Jain, 93 F.3d 436 (8 Cir. 1996)(holding that a
heightened mens rea requirement applies where the defendant must know the conduct is wrong); US.
v. Starks, 157 F.3d 833 (11 tu Cir. 1998)(holding that the law does not require knowledge that the
arrangement for referrals violated the statute. The law only requires knowledge that the conduct was
tmlawfid.). See also, Douglas A. Blair, The "’Knowingly and Willfully" Continuum ofthe AntiKickback Statute’s Scienter Requirement: Its Origins, Complexities, and MostRecent Judicial
Developments, 8 ANNALS HEALTI-I L. 1 (1999).

15

referral prohibitions and the need to establish a separate and distinct law prohibiting

physician self-referral. 9

29

YhoIrlas S. Crane, The Problems ofPhysician Self-Referral Under the Medicare and Medicaid
Antikickback Statute, 268 JAMA 85 (1992).

II1. THE LAW OF SELF-REFERALa

A. Stark I and H

In 1989, Congress established the Ethics in Patient Referrals Act, otherwise
known as Stark I, in an effort to control increased spending caused by physician selfreferrals. This law regulates a physician’s referrals to an entity in which the physician
has an ownership or investment interest. Stark I prohibits physicians from referring
Medicare patiems to a clinical laboratory in which the physician or a family member

has a financial interest and prohibits billing Medicare for such a referral.
Stark II, promulgated in 1993, expanded the referral and billing prohibitions of
Stark 131 to include laboratories and ten new designated health services 3 in which a

physician or family member has an ownership or investment interest or from which
the physician receives compensation. 3 Stark is an exceptions statute. First, it

declares all referrals to entities in which a physician has a financial interest to be

illegal. Then, the statute allows for certain self-referrals if they fit within an

exception. The exceptions attempt to allow for legitimate investments, arrangements
with legitimate social objectives, and realities of practice. Exceptions fall into three
basic categories:

1) general exceptions, 2) ownership or investment interest

30

A smmnary of Stark I and Hand corresponding regulations are attached as Table I.
Stark II also makes the self-referral prohibition applicable to services paid by Medicaid. No payment
will be paid to a state for a service fttmished upon referral if Medicare would not cover the service if it
31

were paying for the service directly.
No payment will be made for illegal referrals covered by eleven designated health services, namely:
clinical laboratory services; physical therapy services; occupational therapy services; radiology, MR[,
CAT and ultrasound; radiation therapy services and supplies; durable medical equipment and supplies;
parenteral and enteml nutrients, equipment and supplies; prosthetics, orthotics and prosthetic devices;
home health services and supplies; outpatient prescription drugs; and inpatient and outpatient hospital
services.
33
A compensation anangement is more specifically defined as any arrangement involving any
remuneration between a physician and an entity except for certain refunds and administrative or cursory
3

16

17

exceptions, and 3) compensation arrangement exceptions.

1. General Exceptions

There are three general self-referral exceptions. These exceptions relate to

physician services, in-office ancillary services and prepaid plans. The physician
services exception34 allows a physician to refer an otherwise prohibited designated

health service to himself, if the physician personally provides the designated health

service, or to an affiliated group member, if the service is personally supervised by a
group member. 3 The in-office ancillary service exception allows otherwise

prohibited designated health services to be provided personally by the referring

physician, by a physician who is a member of the same group practice as the referring
physician, or by individuals who are directly supervised by such a physician. In order
to qualify for the in-office ancillary service exception, certain location and billing

requirements must be met, such as the same-building and group billing number
requirements. 36 The prepaid plan exception allows a physician t.o refer patients for a
charges. Remuneration is defined as any remuneration, directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in
cash or inkind. 42 U.S.C. 1395nn(h)(1).
34
42 U.S.C. 1395rm(b)(1).
3s
Where a group member is attempting to qualify for the personal services exception or the in-o/rice
ancillary service exception, group practice requirements must be met. "Group practice" means a group
of two or more physicians legally organized in which each physician who is a member of the group
provides substantially the full range of services which the physician routinely provides through the joint
use of facilities, equipment, and personnel. Each group physician must provide substantially all of the
services through the group, and the services must be billed in the name of the group. Members of the
group must personally conduct no less than 75 percent of the physician-patient encounters of the group
practice. Overhead expenses and income must be distributed in accordance with methods previously
determined by the group. Compensation of group members cannot be based on the volume or value of
referrals. However, a physician in group practice may be paid on a share of overall profits or a
productivity bonus based on services personally performed so long as the share or bonus does not take
into account the volume or value of referrals. 42 U.S.C. 1395rm(h)(4).
3a
The service must be provided in the building where the referring physician or another physician who
is a member of the same group practice provides unrelated physician services or, if the referring
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designated health service when the service is furnished by an organization receiving

payments on a prepaid basis, such as a health maintenance organization.

2. Ownership or Investment Interest Exceptions

There are four ownership or investmem interests exceptions. There is an

exception for investment securities, rural services and two exceptions relating to

hospital ownership. A physician is allowed to have an ownership or investment
interest in certain publicly traded securities and mutual funds from regulated
investment companies, as long as these securities were purchased on terms generally

available to the public, as A rural provider may have an ownership or investment
interest in an entity providing designated health services in a rural area if substantially

all of the designated health services furnished by the entity are furnished to individuals

residing in the rural area. 39 A designated health service may be provided by a hospital
in which the provider has an ownership or investment imerest if the referring

physician is authorized to perform services at the hospital and the ownership or
investment interest is in the hospital as a whole and not merely in a subdivision of the

hospital. 4 Physicians may have an ownership or investment interest in hospitals in

Puerto Rico that provide designated health services upon referral. 41
physician is a member of a group practice, the service can be provided in another building used by the
group practice for the centralized provision of some or all of the group’s clinical laboratory services or
other designated health services. The service must be billed by the physician performing or supervising
the service, by a group practice under a group billing number or by an entity that is wholly owned by
the physician or group practice. 42 U.S.C. 1395nn(b)(2).
37
42 U.S.C. 1395nn(b)(3).
38
42 U.S.C. 1395nn(c)(additional shareholder equity and total assets requirements must be met).
39
42 U.S.C. 1395nn(d)(2).
40
42 U.S.C. 1395nn(d)(3).
41
42 U.S.C. 1395nn(d)(1).
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3. Compensation Arrangement Exceptions

There are nine exceptions to the prohibition against referring a patiem to an
entity with which the physician has a compensation arrangement. There is an

exception for space and equipmem remal, bona fide employmem arrangements,

personal services, physician incentive plans, non-designated health services, physician
recruitment, isolated transactions, group practice arrangemems with hospitals and

paymem by physicians for items or services.
The equipmem and space leasing exception provides that referring physicians

may receive certain compensation under a space or equipment lease from an entity
providing designated health services. 4 Under the bona fide employmem exception, an

employer may pay compensation to a physician or immediate family member who has
a bona fide employment relationship with the employer if the employment is for

identifiable services. 43 Personal service arrangements are allowed under certain
circumstances. 44 Physician incentive plans allow compensation to be determined by
42

The lease must be in writing, signed by the parties, for a term of at least one-year, specifng the
space or equipment to be leased. Compensation cannot be beyond that which is reasonable and
necessary for legitimate business purposes. The lease must establish the rental charge in advance,
consistent with fair market value (defined as the value in arms length transactions, consistent with the
general market value, 42 U.S.C. 1395nn(h)(3)), and not taking into account the volume or value of

any referrals or business generated between the parties. The lease must be commercially reasonable
even if no referrals were made between the parties. Further, the space or equipment must be used
exclusively by the lessee, with some exceptions for common space. 42 U.S.C. 1395nn(e)(1).
43
The amount of compensation must be consistent with the fair market value for the services and not
determined by considering the volume or value of referrals. The compensation must be provided
pursuant to an agreement that would be commercially reasonable even ff no referrals were made. This
section explicitly allows productivity bonuses based on services performed personally by the physician
or an immediate family member. 42 U.S.C. 13 95nn(e)(2).
44
Personal service arrangements are generally allowed if the arrangement is set out in writing, signed
by the parties specifying the services covered by the arrangement, which must include all of the services
to be provided by the physician. The services to be provided must not exceed those that are reasonable
and necessary for the legitimate business purposes of the arrangement. The term of the anangement

2O

taking into accoum the volume or value of referrals or other business generated in
order to reduce or limit services provided. Physician incentive plans are allowed
under Stark if the physician complies with applicable law. 45 A physician may receive

compensation from a hospital for an item or service that does not relate to the
provision of a designated health service. 46 Further, a hospital may pay remuneration
to a physician to induce the physician to relocate to a geographic area served by the

hospital as long as the physician is not required to refer to the hospital and the
remuneration for relocation does not take into account the volume or value of any

referrals. 47 The isolated transaction exception allows arrangements such as a one-time
sale of property or practice. 48 The group practice arrangement exception allows a

hospital to bill for inpatient services provided by a few group practices. 49 Last, a
physician may pay for the provision of a designated health service if the item or
service is furnished at a price that is consistent with the fair market value. 5

must be for at least one year and the agreement must set out in advance the compensation arrangement
which cannot exceed the fair market value and cannot take into account the volume or value of referrals
or other business generated. 42 U.S.C. 1395rm(e)(3)(A).
45
No payment under such a plan may be made specifically as an inducement to reduce or limit
medically necessary services and the plan must comply with regulations if the plan places the provider

at substantial financial risk. 42 U.S.C. 1395nn(e)(3)(B).
42 U.S.C. 13 95nn(e)(4).
47
42 U.S.C. 1395rm(e)(5).
48
The transaction must be consistent with fair market value and not determined in a manner that takes
into account the volume or value of any referral by the referring physician. The one-time transaction
must be provided pursuant to an agreement that would be commercially reasonable even without
referrals. 42 U.S.C. 1395nn(e)(6). "Commercially reasonable" is not defined by Stark.
49
The arrangement must have begun before December 19, 1989 and continued without interruption
since that date. The arrangement must be in writing specifng the services to be provided and
compensation to be received. Substantially all designated health services must be provided by the
group under the arrangement. The compensation must be consistent with the fair market value, not
46
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4. Reporting, Penalties, and Agency Authority

Stark requires any entity providing covered services to report concerning the

emity’s ownership, investmem, and compensation arrangemems. 1 Violations of Stark
can result in substantial sanctions, including denial or refund of payment, civil

monetary penalties and exclusion from participation in federally funded health care

programs. 52
Finally, Stark requires that the Secretary of the Department of Health and

Human Services issue advisory opinions concerning whether a referral relating to a
designated health service is prohibited.

The Secretary is authorized to promulgate

regulations including the ability to define additional exceptions that do not pose a risk
of program or patient abuse. 4

determined by taking into account the volume or value of referrals, and commercially reasonable even
if no referrals were made. 42 U.S.C. 1395nn(e)(7).
so
42 U.S.C. 1395rm(e)(8).
51
42 U.S.C. 1395nn(f).
52
No payment will be made for a designated health service that is provided in violation of Stark. Any
amount collected for items or services billed in violation of Stark must be refunded. Any person that
presents a bill for a service that the person knows or should know is for a service for which payment is
prohibited by Stark or for which refund has not been made is subject to a civil monetary penalty of
$15,000 for each service billed. If a physician or entity enters into an arrangement which the entity or
physician knew or should have known had a principal purpose of assuring referrals, the physician or
entity shall be subject to a civil monetary penalty of $100,000 for each arrangement or scheme. Any
person or entity that fails to comply with the reporting requirements of Stark is subject to a civil
monetary penalty of not more than $10,000 per day for which reporting was required. 42 U.S.C.
13 95nn(g)(1-5).
53
42 U.S.C. 1395nn(g)(6).
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B. Regulatory Guidance Interpreting Stark I and H
1. Stark I Regulations

Regulations promulgated pursuant to Stark 15 clarify the law and add

regulatory exceptions to the statutory exceptions. 56 Stark is interpreted by the
regulations to prohibit the maximum number of possible self-referral situations. For

example, the regulations define ’clinical laboratory services,’ ’substantially all’ and
’immediate family member’ in an attempt to maximize the number of health care self-

referral arrangements that are prohibited by Stark. 57 The regulations also try to control
the use of group practices that qualify for an exception under Stark by requiring a
54

42 U.S.C. 1395nn(b)(4).
The Stark I regulations do not explicitly address Stark II and do not explicitly apply to Medicaid,
however, they have been used by analogy. See infra, section III.B.2.
56
42 C.F.R. 411.351 et seq.
57
See e.g., Clinical Laboratory Services: The regulations define clinical laboratory services to
encompass every examination of any material derived from the human body. 42 C.F.R. 411.351.
Direct Supervision: The direct supervision requirement of the in-office ancillary services exception is
defined as supervision by a physician who is present in the office suite and immediately available to
provide assistance and direction throughout the time services are being performed. Id..
Substantially All: The requirement that substantially all of the services of the physicians who are
members of the group are furnished through the group and billed in the name of the group is clarified to
mean at least 75 percent of the total patient care services of the group practice members. Patient care
services means any tasks performed by a group practice member that addresses the medical needs of a
patient, regardless of whether they involve direct patient encounters. Patient care services can include
time spent consulting with another physician or time spent reviewing test results. The patient care
services requirement is measured by the total patient care time each member spends on these services.
A ratio of the total hours spent in practice versus the hours spent on patient care is utilized. This
requirement does not apply if the practice is located in a health professional shortage area ("t-IPSA") or
for service provided in an HPSA. Members of the group include physician partners and full-time and
part-time physician contractors and employees that bill in the name of the group. Id.
Group practice attestation: The regulations require a group practice attestation where the group
practice must submit a written statement armually or when formed or when the group meets the
requirements to attest that dining the last twelve months 75 percent of the total patient care services of
the group practice members was furnished through the group and billed by the group. 42 C.F.R.
411.360.
Immediate Family Member: Immediate family member is defined as husband or wife; natural or
adoptive parent, child or sibling; stepparent, stepchild; stepbrother, or stepsister; father-in-law; motherin-law, brother-in-law, or sister-inqaw; grandparent or grandchild; and spouse of a grandparent or
grandchild. 42 C.F.R. 411.351.
5s
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group practice attestation, which requires the group to document that it satisfies the
group practice requirements. 5

Many exceptions, such as the rural provider, hospital ownership and physician
recruitment exceptions, have been clarified. 9 New exceptions have been added

indicating that referrals for services furnished in an ambulatory surgical center, end
stage renal disease facility or by hospice are not prohibited, if payment is included in

the standard rate for each. 6 The regulations also clarify reporting requirements61 and
the procedure for requesting advisory opinions from the Health Care Financing
Administration (HCFA). 62

2. Advisory Opinions

The Office of Inspector General (OIG) and HCFA issued three advisory

opinions that deal with physician self-referral. The first advisory opinion, issued by
the OIG pursuant to the anti-kickback provisions of the Health Insurance Portability

and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), relates to self-referral in joint venture
8

59

Id.

See e.g., Rural Provider: The physician may refer to a rural laboratory that the physician has an
ownership or investment interest in if that laboratory performs the tests on the premises of the rural
laboratory or if not, the laboratory bill Medicare directly for the testing and substantially all, defined by
these regulations as no less than 75 percent, of all of the tests are furnished to individuals who reside in
the rttml area. 42 C.F.R. 433.356.
Hospital Ownership: The hospital ownership exception is clarified in that the physician’s ownership
or investment interest must be in the entire hospital and not merely in a distinct part or depament of
the hospital. The regulation adds that until January 1, 1995, the refemng physician’s ownership or
investment interest must not relate directly or indirectly to the furnishing of clinical laboratory services.
Id.
Physician Recruitment: The physician recruitment exception is altered by regulation in that the
physician cannot be precluded from establishing staff privileges at another hospital or referring business
to another entity. 42 C.F.R. 411.3 57.
6o
42 C.F.R. 411.3 55.
61
42 C.F.R. 411.361.
62
42 C.F.R. 411.370 et seq.
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arrangements and pre-dates Stark. HCFA issued two additional advisory opinions

imerpreting sections of Stark pursuant to the authority granted to it by the Department
of Health and Human Services (DttHS) under the Balanced Budget Act of 1997.
The two advisory opinions issued by HCFA discuss ambulatory surgical treatmem
centers and referrals for eyeglasses following cataract surgery.

a. Joint Venture Arrangements Advisory Opinion

In 1989, the OIG issued a joint vemure advisory opinion under the antikickback statute before the initiation of any formal legal prohibition on self-referral.

The anti-kickback statute is a federal law that makes it a crime to solicit, receive or

pay any remuneration for the referral of a patiem or to induce the referral of a
patient. 64 The OIG raised concern about situations when physicians become investors
in a joint venture emity and thereafter refer patients to that entity, benefiting

financially from their referrals. The OIG identified three areas of a joim venture that
would be reviewed for suspect activity. First, the manner in which investors are

selected and retained should be reviewed to ensure that investors are not required to
refer or in a position to make referrals. Second, the nature of the business structure of

the joint venture should be reviewed to ensure that the joint venture is not merely a
shell to cover for kickbacks and referrals. Third, the financing and profit distributions
of the joim venture should be reviewed to ensure that returns are proportionate to the
63

42 U.S.C.

1395nn(g)(6); 63 Fed. Reg. 1646 (Final Rule implementing Stark law advisory opinion

process).
64

See, 42 U.S.C. 1320a-7b.
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fmancial risk of the investor.

The OIG sere the advisory opinion to every provider

of health care services in the Medicare program as a warning to those engaged in
abusive self-referral arrangemems. 66

b. Joint Venture Ambulatory Surgical Treatment Center

Advisory Opinion

Under Stark, HCFA issued an advisory opinion that interpreted the rural

provider exception of Stark II as applied to an ambulatory surgical treatment center

(ASTC). ASTC investors requested advice on whether or not a proposed joint venture
violated Stark. HCFA found that an ASTC that planned to offer investors up to 49

percent of the company’s interest in profits, losses, and cash flow, in exchange for
67
capital contributions, created an ownership or investment interest. Therefore, Stark

prohibited the arrangement unless it fit within an exception. HCFA found that the
rural provider exception applied. The rural provider exception requires that services

provided by the proposed ASTC actually be furnished in a rural area and that
substantially all of the services furnished by the ASTC be furnished to individuals
6s

Investors should not be chosen because they are in a position to make referrals or based on their
capacity to make referrals. Divestiture of a physician’s interest based on the failure to make referrals or

for moving out of the practice area are indicators of a violation of the anti-kickback statute, ff the joint
venture tracks sources of referral and distributes this information to investors, the arrangement may be
suspect. Business structures that are only shell joint ventures for the purpose of covering for kickbacks
for referrals are not allowed. If the amount of capital invested by the physician is disproportionately
small and the returns on investment disproportionately large when compared to the typical investment,
the financing and profit distribution or disproportionate returns in comparison with fmancial risk makes
the venture suspect for violation of the fraud and abuse statute.
66
Medicare Physician Referral Laws: Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Health of the House
Committee on Ways andMeans, 1999 WL 304835 (1999)(statement olD. McCarty Thornton, Chief
Counsel to the Inspector General, Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Depamrtent of Health and

Human Services).
67

HCFA-AO-98-001. OBER KALER, HEALTH LAW ALERT, Fall 1998/Winter 1999.
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residing in the rural area. 68 HCFA decided that this ASTC satisfied the rural provider

exception. Therefore, because the rural provider exception covered this ASTC, any
physician, including a non-surgeon physician investor, could refer patients to the

ASTC without violating Stark.

c. Referrals for Eyeglasses Following Cataract Surgery Advisory
v

Opinion

Opthamologists and physicians proposed to form a partnership to provide

eyeglasses to their patients following cataract surgery with intraocular lens implams. 7
Technically, the referral of a patiem to a partnership in which the referring physician is
a partner is a prohibited self-referral under Stark. It is a prohibited self-referral

because the physician has an investmem imerest in the partnership and has a

compensation arrangement with the partnership to which the physician is referring
patients. However, HCFA approved the proposed partnership. HCFA determined in
the advisory opinion that the partnership qualified as a group practice71 and
determined that the arrangement would satisfy the in-office ancillary service
68

A mml area is any area that is not an urban area. An urban area is an area within a Metropolitan
Statistical Area, as defined by the Office of Management and Budget, or an area recognized as urban
by regttlation. The area of the proposed ASTC was considered a rural area because it was not listed as
an urban area. HCFA referenced the Stark II proposed regulations to define ’substantially all’ as 75%.
HCFA clarifies that the substantially all requirement is an ongoing requirement in order to remain
within the nnal provider exception. Id.
69
HCFA-AO-98-002. OBER KALER, HEALT LAW ALERT, Spring/Summer 1999.
70
Although not relevant to the self-referral issue, the partnership will also provide services to nonpatients. Id.
7
In order to determine whether the proposed partnership qualified as a group practice, HCFA analyzed
the five key elements of the definition of group practice, including: 1) does each member of the group
provide substantially the full range of services, 2) will substantially all (75%) of the members’ services
be provided through the group and billed by the group, 3) will overhead expenses and income from the
practice be distributed in accordance with methods determined prior to the time period the group has
earned the income or incurred the cost, 4) will no physician member be compensated directly or
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exception. 72 Additionally, HCFA utilized the proposed Stark II regulations, although

they do not yet have the force of law, when analyzing this issue because "it reflects

[HCFA’ s] current imerpretation of the law."

indirectly based on the volume or value of referrals and, 5) will members of the group, physician
owners and employees, provide at least 75 percent of the physician patient encounters, ld.
72
First, the services of the group would be furnished or directly supervised by the referring physician or
by a member of the same group practice. Second, the services would be furnished in a location where
the group practice provides services urtrelated to designated health services or a broader range of
services than those considered to be designated health services or if the designated health services are
furnished in another building that is used by the group for the centralized provision of designated health
services. And, third, the services would be billed under the group practice’s group billing number, ld.

IV. DIFFICULTIES AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF STARK

Even though Stark has substantially succeeded in prohibiting health care
arrangements that allow self-referral and lead to over-utilization and inappropriate
medical care, a number of concerns and unintended consequences for health care

providers resulted from its application. These problems are created by specific
unintended consequences, the problem of complexity, adverse effects on appropriate

health care arrangements, and overzealous prosecution. 73

A. A Specific Example of Unintended Consequences

One of many examples of Stark’s unintended and negative consequences
involves Extracorporeal Shock Wave Lithotripsy (ESWL). ESWL is one of the most

effective and widely used urology.services for the non-invasive treatmem of kidney
stones. At the time of its imroduction in 1984 many hospitals were unable to purchase

the extraordinarily expensive machinery. As a result, urologists created joint venture
facilities to raise capital to purchase this equipmem. ESWL is considered by HCFA to

fall within a designated health service and self-referral is prohibited unless excepted

by the statute. As such, physicians may not be able to treat patients at the facility in
which they have a financial imerest. This causes disruptions for patiem access by

forcing patiems to travel to another facility not owned by the physician. In some
states, the patient may actually have to travel outside of the state to receive this care.

Continuity of care may also be compromised if the physician cannot easily follow the
73

See generally, AMERICAN HEALTH LAWYERS ASSOCIATION. FRAUD AND ABUSE: DO CURRENT
LAWS PROTECT THE PUBLIC INTEREST? A Report on the 1999 Public Interest Colloquium Held January
29-30, 1999. Washington, D.C.
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patient. Further, non-urologist owned facilities could become flooded with Medicare
and Medicaid patiems, creating delays of service for only one category of patiems,

thereby creating a two-tiered health care system. 74

Because this form of raising capital is inhibited by Stark, the law may actually
compromise access to health care. 7 Patient access may be compromised if a

physician cannot refer a patiem or is afraid to refer a patiem to the best provider

merely because a questionable financial relationship may lead the physician to believe

that that referral may be prohibited. Physicians may also be prohibited from bringing
the latest technology to their patiems if no other investors are available.

B. The Problem of Complexity
The law is complex and difficult to imeroret. 7 Although Stark meant to be a

"bright line" test to determine acceptable conduct, many of its terms are broad or
ambiguous. In addition, the voluminous regulations designed to clarify the law only

compound the problem. Even prominem lawyers in the field of health care fraud and
74

Another example involves new therapies such as those to treat benign prostatic hypellasia, or
enlarged prostate, which could be in jeopardy by self-referral prohibitions. The eqm’pment needed to
treat this disease requires a large capital investment. A joint venture would inevitably be required to
establish a facility, but Stark would prevent many potential investors from joining in the venture and
potentially prohibit the venture from occumng. Accordingly, no treatment for certain diseases in
certain areas of the country will be available. Id.
7s
The law alters the natural state of market competition. The law allows designated health services to
compete on the basis of cost and services rather than on the basis of whether a financial relationship
exists with the referring provider. However, it may be hannfifl to prevent refenSng physicians from
entering their health care market as competitors because access and quality of care may suffer. If these
providers are allowed to enter the market as competitors and self-referral is allowed, it would prevent
competitors from entering the market because there would be no business to acquire.
76
Duplicity of laws creates fitler complexity, which is not discussed by this paper. If a provider
complies with the anti-kickback law, which is apparently more strict than Stark, the provider may not
be in compliance with Stark. It is very difficult to ensure that an arrangement satisfies each fraud and
abuse law.
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abuse find Stark extremely ambiguous and confusing. 77 The exceptions and

regulations are so vast and puzzling that a bright line no longer exists. Providers spent
six years without guidance from HCFA. During the six ye_ars, many activities began

that now would be prohibited and many activities that would have been useful were
not begun. It is not clear if lawyers will be able to give providers clear and

unqualified advice to enable providers to comply with the law.
The laws on fraud and abuse are so confusing that two lawyers charged with

fraud and abuse violations because of advice to there clients regarding how to operate
under health care fraud and abuse laws were later exonerated. 78 The absolving judge
criticized the complexity of the health care fraud laws by stating that "no reasonable

jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the lawyers willfully committed any of
the criminal acts charged in the indictment." The court found that the law was in a
state of flux and that the lawyers had adapted their advice as the law changed in an

attempt to facilitate legal transactions. However, charges still stand in the matter
against two doctors and three former hospital executives. 79

The government contends that the laws cannot possibly be confusing because
89 percent of audits were found to be unwarranted. They argue that this high rate of

compliance leads to the conclusion that providers are able to comply with the law.

However, it is possible that 89% of audits are unwarranted not because of compliance
but merely because normative physician behavior is adverse to self-referral. In other
77

Medicare Physician Referral Laws. Testimony Before the Subcommittee on. Health of the House
Committee on Ways andMeans. 1999 WL 304837 (1999)(statement of Sanford V. Teplitzlq,, Partner
Ober, Kaler, Grimes & Shriver).
78
All defendants were indicted for conspiracy to solicit and pay bribes of $2 million and for making
false claims for referring nursing home patients to certain hospitals.

31

words, the 11% of ’warranted audits’ may not be due to an overt failure to comply, but
rather the result of positive attempts to alter the health care environmem without

understanding the complexity of the government prohibitign on certain self-referral
arrangements.

C. Adverse Effects on Appropriate Health Care Arrangements

As health care transactions and relationships become more complex and
sophisticated, it is not always clear when Stark applies or whether Stark’s protection is
necessary.
Medical practice is becoming increasingly complex as more cost effective and
efficient health care arrangements, such as managed care, emerge. Managed care

reduces the opportunity for physicians to make referrals based on personal gain. 8
These complex arrangements are designed to realize cost-effective care and may cause
no self-referral concerns, but none-the-less remain questionable under Stark.

Stark fails to adequately address the complexity of relationships among

providers and sometimes applies in an ambiguous manner to particular types of
business arrangements. The law was written at a time when most providers organized
as independent practitioners instead of today’s group practices and most entities were
not part of a health care system. The iment of the law was to make it more difficult to

structure business relationships in the health care environmem and it has succeeded

because questionable joint ventures are much less common today. However, the
79

United States v. Anderson, No. 98-20030 (D. Kan. 1998)
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statute may prohibit arrangements that would not cause concerns over self-referral,

such as those depicted in the specific examples, discussed supra. Further difficulty is
created in attempting to apply Stark to complex corporate._structures in light of OIG’ s

policy of collapsing complex corporate structures. 81

Many complex health care business structures are difficult to create and utilize
under the current law. 82 The law may be impeding efforts to create more efficient
initiatives that provide the same or better quality of care. Integrated organizations

such as a joint venture PHO in which a hospitaland a group of physicians are equal

partners create issues of self-referral violations. The PHO is generally organized to

negotiate and administer managed care comracts. At first glance, participation in a

PHO appears to present no issue because no relationship exists between the physicians
and the hospital whereby physicians would be referring patiems to an entity in which
the physician had a financial imerest. However, the hospital’s large capital investment

and low risk of financial loss may lead to fraud and abuse issues if it can be shown

that there is an indirect form of illegal remuneration to physicians when the physician

refers a patient to the partner hospital. It is uncertain whether this is covered
exclusively under the anti-kickback statute or additionally under Stark.

80

Medicare Physician Referral Laws. Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Health ofthe House
Committee on Ways andMeans. 1999 WL 304870 (1999)(statement of The Honorable William M.

Thomas, Chairman).
For example, complex relationships involving PHOs or other marketing entities or MSOs employing
physicians and leasing physician practice space generally engage in business purposes with no
perception of referral inducement but may be considered within the referral scheme if they are part of
the corporate structure that is revolved in the referrals.
82
Leonard C. Homer, How New Federal Laws Prohibiting Physician SelfReferrals Affect Integrated
Delivery Systems, 11 HEALTH SPAN 21 (April, 1994).
81
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D. Law Enforcement in Health Care
Overzealous prosecution creates an unsuitable environment for health care

providers because they live in fear that a simple mistake may trigger an investigation
or even prosecution. Unclear laws and regulations leave providers in constant

confusion over whether they are complying with the law. Prosecutorial discretion

makes compliance difficult because each investigator interprets and applies the law

differently. Also, many investigators interpret and apply the law in a different manner
than health care providers who attempt to work within the ever-changing framework

of health care. Providers are required to expend money and time to undertake
compliance efforts and often are afraid to contest allegations because the penalties can
be so high.

Prosecutorial problems are in part due to the astounding number of governmem

groups (more than fifteen) that are assisting in the investigation of health care fraud
and abuse. 3 Each group competes for political status and funding by seeking to
enforce health care .fraud and abuse.

However, it appears that the concern about overzealous prosecution may be,
for the most part, rhetoric. No case has ever been successfully brought under Stark,

only a few dozen providers faced criminal sanctions under the anti-kickback statute

and the government has assured providers in writing that innocent business mistakes
will not be prosecuted. However, some believe it is clear that the investigatory body,
83

These groups include: Congress, Department of Health and Human Services, Healthcare Financing
Administration, Office of Program Integrity, Office of Inspector General, Department of Justice,
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Medicare contractors, Peer Review Organizations, Department of
Labor, Department of Veteran Affairs, Department of Defense, State Attorneys General, Medicaid
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or group of bodies, must be simplified and communication must be increased between

these groups in order to ensure a streamlined and understandable enforcement
mechanism. Simplification is necessary because even though no case has ever been

successfully brought under Stark, enforcement still continues.

Fraud Control Units, private payors, and private citizens. Further, a new Health Integrity and Protection
Data Bank will collect and store information on fraud and abuse enforcement actions.

V. PROPOSED CLARIFICATIONS TO STARK

A. Proposed Stark II Regulations
HCFA plans to issue final regulations (otherwise known as roles) based on
Stark II by May of 2000. 84 The roles were first proposed on January 9, 1998 and

attempt to make it easier for physicians to work in an integrated health system. HCFA
is currently reviewing the more than 12,800 comments received on these proposed

regulations. 8 Although the proposed regulations are meant to clarify the law and
create more flexibility, they are nearly four hundred pages long and reflect the

complexity of the self-referral prohibitions they are meant to clarify. 86

1. Discussion

The proposed roles clarify and define many terms used in the Stark

legislation, s7 Footnote 87 gives an example of seven definitions and clarifications of

84

Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Physicians; Referrals to Health Care Entities With Which They
Have Financial Relationships, 63 Fed. Reg. 1659 (1998)(to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt 411,424, 435,
and 455)(proposed January 9, 1998).
85
See generally, Andrew B. Wachler & Phyllis A. Avery. Stark 1I Proposed Regulations: Rule Offers
Additional Guidance While Regulators Seek More Input From Health Care Community. THE HEALTH
LAWYER. January 1998; NHLA/AAHA. Spotlight on the Stark IlRegulations. HEALTH LAWYERS
NEWS. February 1998; JOANNE SINSCI-IEIMER & SANFORD TEPLITZKEY. AMERICAN HEALTH LAWYERS
ASSOCIATION. FRAUD AND ABUSE: COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT. October, 22-23, 1998.
Arlington, VA.
6
Medicare Physician Referral Laws. Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Health of the House
Committee on Ways andMeans. 1999 WL 304833 (1999)(statement ofKathleen A. Buto, Health Care

Financing Administration).
7
See e.g., Entity: Entity means any entity that provides designated health services, without
qualifications or limits. A physician or group of physicians is referring to an entity even when they are
referring to, or among, themselves. These types of self-referrals must meet an exception, such as the
personal service exception or the in-office ancillary service exception. Medicare and Medicaid
Programs; Physicians; Referrals to Health Care Entities With Which They Have Financial
Relationships, 63 Fed. Reg. 1659, 1685 (1998)(to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt 411,424, 435, and
455)(proposed January 9, 1998).
Financial Relationship: The term financial relationship is clarified. A referral alone does not create a
financial relationship. Id. at 1686. The rule clarifies that indirect fmancial relationships of any degree
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words used in Stark II. This paper briefly discusses several regulatory clarifications

regarding various Stark exceptions, including group practice, in-office ancillary
services, durable medical equipmem, prepaid plan, personal services, and provision of

designated health services exceptions are outlined. In addition, three new

compensation arrangement exceptions are discussed. Finally, reporting, sanction and
advisory opinion clarifications are mentioned.

are covered by the rule just as direct financial relationships are. In other words, if a physician refers a
patient to an entity for the provision of services that will be referred out to an entity in which that
physician has an ownership or investment interest, Stark will be violated. This interpretation fulfills the
intent of the statute in preventing physicians from evading the prohibition by establishing holding
companies rather than investing directly in the entity furnishing the designated health service. In short,
"the number of layers of ownership is irrelevant, as long as the physician or family member has
established an indirect interest." Further, payment received as a return on an investment is not
compensation prohibited by the Act. Id. at 1687.
Referral: The rule clarifies the definition of referral, which is now defined as the request by a
physician, directly or through a plan of care, for a designated health service for which payment may be
made under Medicare or Medicaid, including the request for a consultation with another physician and
any test or procedure ordered by, or to be performed by or under the supervision of that other physician.
Id. at 1692.
Service: The term ’service’ is now used in place of’services and items,’ and the term ’service’
includes ’items.’ Id.
Remuneration: The rule revises the definition of remuneration to meet the requirements of the
statute. Remuneration does not include fee for service payments made by an insurer to a physician, so
long as they meet the requirements of the statute and do not take into account other business generated
by the parties. Id.
Fair Market Value: The term fair market value is used in most of the compensation-related
exceptions. Most of the compensation discussed must be based on the fair market value, consistent
with the general market value. General market value is defined by the rule as "the price that an asset
would bring, as the restdt of bona fide bargaining between well-informed buyers and sellers, or the
compensation that would be included in a service agreement, as the result of bona fide bargaining
between well-informed parties to the agreement, on the date of acquisition of the asset or at the time of
the service agreement." Id at 1686.
Volume or Value of Referrals: The nile clarifies that anywhere the statute refers to the ’volume or
value of referrals,’ HCFA will also evaluate business generated between the parties. Although
arrangements predicated on the volume or value of referrals are prohibited, a physician can on his or her
own or at the request of a patient refer patients within a network as long as compensation is not directly
predicated on the volume or value of referrals to in-network providers, ld. at 1699.
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2.

Group Practices

HCFA’s regulation construed Stark’s group practice requiremems contained in
the physician service and in-office ancillary service exceptions. 88 The regulations

prevent many groups from joining together for the sole purpose of taking advantage of
the exceptions, s9 The regulations also require that each member of a group provide

substantially the full range of patient care services that the individual physician
routinely furnishes. The definition of patient care services is broadened by this rule. 9

For example, substantially all patient care services must be furnished through the
group and be billed under a billing number assigned to the group. 91 The definition of
member is expanded to include all owner physicians, regardless of their ownership

interest, and employee physicians. 9 Under the proposed rule, independent contractors
88

To qualify as a group, physicians must be legally organized as one legal entity. However, the group
may contain physicians who are individually incorporated and provide services to group patients
because this is not a conglomeration of multiple physician groups but is rather a true group practice.
Also, as a practical matter, the group practice may now bill with more than one billing number and still
qualify as a group practice, so long as the billing numbers used are assigned to the group. This
acknowledges that group practices with many different locations may bill separately. Id. at 1687.

89Id. at 1687.
9o

It includes any patient care tasks including tasks that address the medical needs of patients in general
or that generally benefit the practice. This can include time spent training staff, arranging for
equipment or performing administrative or management tasks, but not teaching in a medical school or
doing outside research. This requirement ensures that the physician member is actually practicing
medicine and not simply part ofthe group so that the group will qtmlify for the exception while
acknowledging that physicians can furnish other kinds of services than just patient care. Accordingly,
time spent performing these tasks will count toward the calculation of patient care services time. But if
a physician spends patient care time in another setting, that will count toward the time spent providing
patient care time for the group, ld. at 1688.
91
Substantially all of the physician-patient encounters must occur between owner or employee
physicians and patients. "Substantially all" means that at least 75% of the patient care services (as
defined supra) must be personally conducted by a member ofthe group. The proposed rule outlines
some guidelines in calculating the 75% limit. In stun, at least 75% of all patient care services, must
occur between owner or employee group physicians and patients, and not provided by non-members of
the group. The ban against payments based on volume or value of referrals would remain, but a bonus
or profit sharing based on services personally performed would be allowed. In determining who is a
group member when malting 75% determinations, independent contractors will not count as qualifying
group members. This assists the group in meeting the substantially all requirement by excluding
specialist contractors who may spend a small amount of time providing group patient care services. Id.
9_
Id. at 1687, 1689.

38

no longer qualify to directly supervise in-office ancillary services. 93 Also, the group

may use a management service organization to administer billing for the group, as

long as the arrangement satisfies a separate regulation. 94 The distribution of overhead
and expenses requirements section of the regulation provides that overhead expenses
and practice income must be distributed in accordance with methods that are

"previously determined" and follows an established plan indicating that the group is a
unified busilless. 95

3. In-Office Ancillary Services Exception

The in-office ancillary service exception section of the statute establishes that
direct supervision means that the physician must be present in the office suite in which

the services are being furnished, at the time they are being furnished. 96 The term
"direct supervision" is construed so narrowly that even simple in-office lab services

performed by technicians would not qualify as an in-office ancillary service if

performed during periods before or after the physician’s regularly scheduled office
93

Id. at 1689.
Zd.
95
"Previously determined" is as determined prior to the time period duling which the group has earned
the income or incurred the costs. The group must have an established plan rather than distributing on an
ad hoc basis. Distribution must be made in a manner that indicates that the practice is a unified
business, reflecting centralized decision making, pooling of expenses and revenues, and a distribution
system that does not treat each satellite office as if it were a separate enterprise. Distribution of profits
or compensation cannot be made based on volume or value of referrals, but a physician can receive a
portion of the pooled profit as long as the physician’s portion is not determined using information
regarding the volume or value of that physician’ s referrals or the volume or value of designated health
services performed. Profit may be distributed based on an investment interest, number of hours worked
or difficulty of work. Productivity bonuses based on services personally performed, but not based on
the volume or value of any referrals, are allowed. Profits from services other than designated health
services may be distributed in any way the group sees fit. Id.
96
Although the physician must actually be physically present, the physician will be considered present
during brief and unexpected absences as well as routine absences of short duration. If the physician is
only available by phone or is only physically present somewhere in the building, the in-office ancillary
94
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hours, or when the physician is out doing hospital rounds or providing care in an
outpatient clinic or another suite within the same building. The rule indicates that inoffice ancillary services are those that are integral to the physician’s own practice and

conducted within his or her own sphere of activity and not a service that is a separate

profit-making enterprise. 97 The rule also narrowly defines the same location
requirement of the in-office ancillary service exception. Same building means one

physical structure, with one address and not connected by tunnels or walkways. The
same location requirement does not permit mobile structures that can be utilized near

the building, such as mobile x-ray vans. 98 Further narrowing is found where the

regulation provides that a service is actually furnished where the procedure is actually

performed on a patient or at the location in which the patiem receives and begins using
the ancillary service. Under this role, services given to a patient to be used at home or
outside the physician’s office have not been furnished in the physician’s office and,

therefore, would not qualify for the in-office ancillary service exception. 99

4. Durable Medical Equipment Exceptions

The role provides that the in-office ancillary service exception does not apply
to durable medical equipmem, other than infusion pumps, or to parenteral and emeral
service exception will not apply. The physician must be otherwise scheduled and ordinarily be
expected to be present. Id.
97
fd. all 1684.
98
The group practice can meet an alternative centralized location requirement ff the location provides
designated health services for more than one group office in one or more centralized locations. The
group, however, would have to have a physician member present to perform or directly supervise the
designated health service. Id.

99fd. at 1695- 1696.
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nutrients, equipmem, and supplies. 1 Although crutches are considered durable
medical equipment, the regulations add crutches to the in-office ancillary service

exception. The role was created because it would be incon_.venient for the patient to
have to obtain crutches elsewhere after having a bone cast at the doctor’s office.

Further, the physician is not expected to see a profit from the crutches.

5. Prepaid Plan Exception

The prepaid plan exception is interpreted in a way that attempts to safeguard

against abuse while facilitating the evolution of integrated delivery and other health
care delivery systems. The exception applies to health maintenance organizations and

other prepaid medical plans that have a contract with Medicare even if these

organizations do not furnish services directly. The role proposes to create an
additional exception for services provided by analogous Medicaid organizations.

However, no exception is created for hybrid systems, typically those utilizing both
fee-for-service and eapitated billing, because there is no guarantee that all of these

systems minimize the risk of patient or program abuse. 1 Although capitated
payments may prevent over-utilization, fee-for-service billing allows a physician to
increase revenue every time a referral is made.

lId, at 1675.101
These hybrid plans, such as preferred provider organizations and physician hospital organizations,
would nomaally find an exception under the personal services exception so that referrals within the
organization would be allowed. Id. at 1697.
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6. Unrelated Remuneration Exception

The new role clarifies the exception for remuneration unrelated to the

provision of designated heakh services and narrows it.

The role states that the

exception does not apply to remuneration from entities other than hospitals and does
not apply to payments to a physician’s family member. The remuneration must not in

any direct or indirect way involve a designated health service or relate to the volume
or value of referrals for designated health services. For example, a physician may be

paid a rental fee for allowing visiting faculty to use the physician’s residence or the

physician might receive compensation for teaching or providing utilization review or
administrative services. The physician may not be paid for technology developed by

the physician because that technology might be used in the furnishing of a designated
health service. The hospital may not provide malpractice insurance or other general
costs that enable the physician to provide a designated health service. 102

7. New Compensation Arrangement Exceptions

Three new compensation arrangement exceptions are created by the rule. First,
a discount exception is created whereby discounts to physicians that are passed on in

full to the patient or the patient’s insurer would be exempt if the referring physician

retained no benefit. The discount is allowed if in "an arm’s length transaction an

entity offers it to all similarly situated individuals, regardless of whether they make
lo:z

Id. at 1702.
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referrals to the entity, the discount does not reflect the volume or value of any referrals
and the discount is passed on to Medicare or other insurers. ’’3

Second, a new fair market value exception covers a.ny compensation
arrangements between a physician or a family member or group of physicians if the
agreement meets certain criteria. 14 This exception attempts to recognize

compensation arrangements that are legitimate and commercially reasonable without

taking into account the volume or value of any referrals. In other words, this
exception is designed to exempt many financial arrangements involved with integrated
delivery systems that have been difficult to realize because of Stark. 1

Third, a new de minimis compensation exception is proposed for de minimis
compensation of less than a $50 value per gift, $300 year aggregate, including free

samples, training, free coffee mugs, or pens, etc. 16 as long as the compensation is
available to all similarly situated individuals regardless of whether they would refer

and the compensation does not take into account the volume or value of any
referrals, lO7

13Id. at 1693.
104

The criteria include a written agreement covering all items and services to be provided specifying the
period of time the arrangement is effective, specifying the compensation that will be provided
consistent with the fair market value, explaining the commercial reasonableness of the Wansaction and
the legitimate business purpose that is furthered by the arrangement, and that the arrangement is in
compliance with the anti-kickback laws. Id.
105
Id. at 1699.
0
Cash equivalents, such as gift certificates, stocks or bonds, and airline frequent flier miles, do not

quat@,
107

za.
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8. Reporting, Penalties, and Agency Authority

The regulations simplify the Stark reporting requiremems.

Physicians will

no longer be required to submit the amount of information_.they were previously

required to submit under Stark I regulations. Physicians need only keep on file the
kind of information that they would normally maimain to meet Imemal Revenue

Service, Securities Exchange Commission, and other Medicare and Medicaid roles.

HCFA feels this would be sufficiem to prove compliance with the self-referral laws.

In addition, the sanctions are changed. The role limits the sanctions applicable
to wrongful referrals involving Medicaid beheficiaries. The only sanction applicable
to a Medicaid provider is that the Act prohibits the payment of federal funds to a state

for services furnished pursuam to a prohibited referral. States must impose their own
sanctions in situations Where state law should prevail.

Lastly, HCFA advisory opinion authority is clarified. Advisory opinions can
be requested from HCFA to determine whether a referral relating to a designated
health service is prohibited under Stark. Stark II regulations provide that no advisory

opinion will be issued on whether the fair market value is being paid or whether an
individual is a bona fide employee. Making individualized determinations of this kind

would be too burdensome.

o Id. at 1703 et

seq.
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B. Proposed Legislation

Congress imroduced two bills in Congress in an effort to modify and clarify
Stark II. The Thomas bill relaxes the self-referral prohibiti_on and the Stark bill

maintains, updates, and clarifies the self-referral prohibition. 19

I. Thomas Bill

Rep. Bill Thomas (R. Cal.) introduced the Physician Self-Referral
Amendmems of 1999.1 The bill eliminates the prohibition on referrals based on

compensation arrangements. Rep. Thomas is concerned with HCFA’s difficulty in
enforcing the Stark self-referral laws. He believes that doctors are the best protectors
of quality health care and are adequate to ensure that Medicare patiems get the care

they need. Physicians, he believes, are an effective tool in the fight against fraud and
abuse. 11 Thomas would make ownership or investment imerest the sole criteria for

barring referrals, thus deleting the confusing compensation arrangement exceptions.
The Thomas bill would repe__al the site of service requirement of the in-office ancillary
service exception. Thomas does not believe that the site-of-service requirement serves

any purpose in combating fraud. Thomas would also modify the physician

supervision requirement for ancillary services. An individual is considered to be
under the "general supervision" of a physician if the physician is legally responsible
for the services performed by the individual and for ensuring that the individual meets
licensure and certification requirements, if any, regardless ofwhether or not the
o9

A summary of the Thomas and Stark bills is attached as Table II.
Cong. U.S. HR 2651.
CCH MEDICARE AND MEDICAID GUIDE, No. 1069 p.3 (1999).

o 1999
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physician is physically present when the individual furnishes the item or service. 112
Implememation of the Thomas bill would not be allowed until final regulations were

promulgated.

2. Stark Bill

Rep. Stark criticizes the Thomas bill as an attempt to repeal the heart of the
physician self-referral law. Stark is concemed that the Thomas bill encourages the
type of abuse by doctors that the Stark law was enacted to rectify and prevent. Stark

fears a return to the days when self-referral cost Medicare hundreds of millions of

dollars and diminished the trust implicit in the doctor-patient relationship. Stark called
the Thomas bill "pro-fraud" with the potential to increase Medicare spending by $500
million dollars over seven years.

Stark imroduced his own legislation entitled the Medicare Physician Self-

Referral Improvement Act of

199.9.113

The bill creates an expansive fair market value

exception for providers who have compensation relationships with entities to which

they refer. The exception allows compensation arrangements unless payment to the

provider exceeds the fair market value.
Similar to Thomas’s bill, the Stark bill indicates that direct supervision of in-

office ancillary services will no longer be required so long as the physician or group

member assumes full and direct legal, financial, and professional responsibility for the
The bill defines member of a group practice as an owner or bona fide employee, or both, in a
purported effort to prevent HHS from regulating the definition. Intraocular lenses, eyeglasses, and
contact lenses are excluded from the designated health service of prosthetics, orthotics and prosthetic
devices, and supplies. Pathologists who supervise or direct the provision of clinical laboratory services
for a group practice are deemed to be members of such group practice. Id.
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services that are provided and for those who provide these services. Also, the prepaid

plan exception is expanded to include Medicaid managed care organizations.

In addition, Stark’s bill adds four new general exceptions for capitated
payments, communities with no alternative providers, ambulatory surgical centers, and
hospice. The prohibition on self-referral does not apply if a designated health service
is included in the services for which a physician or group is paid only on a capitated

basis by a health plan or insurer pursuant to a written arrangement. The bill does not

prohibit a referral for a designated health service furnished in any area where it is
determined that the individuals residing in the area do not have reasonable access to

such designated health services. Also, the bill does not prohibit referrals for

designated health services furnished in ambulatory surgery centers or by a hospice

program.
The compensation arrangement exception section is replaced in the Stark bill.
The Stark law requires that a compensation arrangemem fit within one of nine

exceptions in order to be legal. The bill replaces the nine compensation arrangement

exceptions with a general exception and two additional exceptions for certain
arrangements. The general exception requires the following eight criteria for

permissible compensation arrangements 1) in writing, 2) signed, 3) for a specified
period of time, 4) coveting all of the services to be provided or incorporating by
reference any other arrangements, 5) consistent with fair market value, 6) specifying
the compensation to be provided set in advance not determined in a manner that takes
999 Cong. U.S. HR 2650.
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imo account the volume or value of any referrals, 7) that is commercially reasonable,

and 8) furthers the legitimate business interests of the parties.

Two specific arrangements are excepted from the prohibition on compensation

arrangemems under the Stark bill: physician recmitmem and de minimis payments.
Remuneration provided to induce a physician to relocate to the geographic area served

by a hospital in order to become a member of the hospital’s medical staff is not a
compensation arrangement under the Act. Under this exception, the physician must
not be required to refer patients to the hospital. In addition, the arrangemem must not

take into accoum the volume or value of referrals. Under the de minimis payment

exception, remuneration for items or services not exceeding $50 per gift or $300 per
year that does not take into account the volume or value of referrals will not be
considered a compensation arrangemem.

VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Congress enacted the prohibition on self-referral to comrol over-utilization and
protect the best interests ofthe patient by limiting referrals_, to entities in which a

physician has a financial interest. However, there are legitimate reasons that a
provider might have a financial interest in such entities. These reasons include 1)
ensuring that quality and continuity of care is provided, 2) providing a necessary but

unavailable service to the community, and 3) ensuring that care is provided in a costefficient manner. TM However, the problems of a physician making a decision based

upon financial incemives rather than best medical practice, as discussed in this paper,
must be addressed. The law must reduce potentially harmful incentives of physician

financial imerest while preserving the benefit of such imerests. In addition, the

development of efficient health care arrangements must be addressed and encouraged.
One answer is to allow the health care market to evolve on its own. However,
the health care market will not control itself. Consumer choice is not an appropriate
vehicle by which to control health care referrals because the consumer is not in a

position to make an informed choice about where to have services performed.

Consumers do not have enough information to make this type of decision. Even if
such information was available, the consumer is not in a position to evaluate and made
decisions based on this information. In addition, the patient’s concerns focus on

whether they can be diagnosed, treated, and cured rather than on the efficacy of the
referral.

Fraud in Medicare Programs. Testimony Before the Senate Government Affairs Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations. 1997 WL 360721 (1997)(statement of Pamela H. Bucy, University of
114

Alabama School of Law).
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The currem law and regulation does not realize an optimal balancing of these

competing considerations. In addition, it has created many concerns and unintended

consequences that must be addressed. As Senator Stark stated, "Stark’s original
concern was with referrals outside the doctor’s office where the doctor merely sat

back, having nothing to do with the quality of services, and waited for the distribution
checks to roll in." The law must play a role in ensuring that medical decisions are

based on what is best for the patient and not what is best for the physician. On the
other hand, health care must be allowed to evolve toward a more efficiem system and

physicians should not be prevented from providing better care merely because of the
potential for a conflict of interest.
The concern and solution should focus on quality care and not only pecuniary
interest. For example, group practice members often refer exclusively within their

group. Under the current law, this is allowed, but the patient is probably not receiving
care from the most appropriate provider, rather the provider that can retain the most

profit for the group. Considering the importance of self-determination in health care,
this is not the most appropriate method of referral. Further, even though profit is
maximized for the group, there is no evidence that any savings occurs for the health
care system or that there is any increase in the quality of care for the patient.

Therefore, the problem is not self-referral in a vacuum but rather self-referral that is
increasing costs while decreasing quality of care.

50

Proposed Law Against Self Referral
The following is the author’s proposal to clarify and simplify Stark I and II.
The proposal attempts to prevent the over-utilization that leads to increased health care
cost while allowing the health care system to evolve and protecting the quality of

patient care. 115 Like Stark, the proposal prohibits self-referral schemes unless they fit
within an exception.

However, the exceptions are vastly different than Stark. More

specifically

A physician may not make a referral to an emity for the furnishing of any health
care service and the entity may not cause to be presented a claim for the service if the
physician or immediate family member has an ownership or investment interest in that
entity different than that available to the general public or receives compensation from
that entity greater than the fair market value, unless one of the following is satisfied

1) the physician directly provides or directly supervises the provision of the health
care service; or

2) the referral is to or from another member of the referring physician’s group
practice and;
a) the group does not require referral to another group member or penalize for
referrals outside the group and,
the
patient is offered referral to an appropriate provider outside the group, if
b)
available and,
the
group maintains and reports data to the Board, established infra, on the
c)
percent of patients referred within the group and the percent of patients
referred outside the group. If the group refers less than [40%] of patients
outside the group, exclusive of those patients enrolled in a plan that requires
the provision of care within the group, an audit will result to ensure
compliance with a and b; or

3) there is a demonstrated need for the entity and no alternative investors exist
a) the burden is on the proposed investor to identify and notify all alternative
investors within the area where care will be provided and all known investors
outside that area.
an
alternative investor is one who will not refer to the entity; or
b)
115

Unless otherwise noted, terms are defined as defined in Stark II regulations.
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4) the referring health care provider receives prior approval from the federal Fraud
and Abuse Board, which shall be established to perform the functions required by
this Act.

a) Approval will be granted if the Board finds that there is no chance of abuse of
b)
c)

d)

e)

f)
g)

h)
i)

ovemtilization and no chance of a decrease in qua!_ity of care caused by
referrals to the entity.
Approvals and denials must be thoroughly documented in a written decision by
the Board and, unless otherwise altered by Congress or by the Board in future
decisions, each decision is binding authority for furore referral arrangemems.
Documentation must be provided to the Board for any arrangement that is
created in reliance on a prior documented approval.
If an arrangement is approved or relies on a prior approval, every referring
physician or the entity must annually report the amount of income from the
entity and the value-and volume of referrals to that entity. The Board may
request a hearing on the issue ofwhether ovemtilization or a decrease in
quality of care is occurring or has occurred from the approved arrangement. If
the Board determines by a preponderance of the evidence that there is abuse,
the Board may revoke approval for the referral arrangement. If referrals
continue after approval is revoked, sanctions may be implemented. The Board
may waive the reporting requirements if the Board deems it appropriate.
In addition, the Board shall cause random audits to be made of health care
providers to ensure compliance with this Act. The Board shall promulgate
regulations to fulfill this requirement and must delegate this audit function to a
private entity if it is more efficient.
The Board shall have exclusive jurisdiction to investigate, prosecute, and
adjudicate self-referral issues.
The petitioning party has the burden to prove by substantial evidence all
elements necessary to attain approval by the Board.
The Board shall be composed of two physicians, two OIG personnel, and one
independent consumer as chosen by Congress.
All decisions of the Board may be appealed to the Secretary of Heakh and
Human Services and then to the federal courts.

Sanctions

j) Refunds
k) Civil monetary penalties similar to Stark
1) Exclusion
m) Imprisonment of up to five years for any willful violation of the Act with the
intent to cause ovemtilization or profit at the expense of, or without
consideration for, the quality of patient care.
This proposal attempts to balance the need of the health care system to evolve,
while protecting against overutilization and ensuring quality care. Under this
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proposal, a physician may maintain any ownership or investment imerest so long as
the imerest is one that is generally available to the general public and may retain any

compensation as long as it is not greater than the fair mark_et value. If the imerest is
available only to groups smaller than the public at large, such as only a group of

physicians, or compensation is greater than the fair market value, any referrals to that
entity will be prohibited unless an exception is met.

If the physician directly provides or directly supervises the provision of the

service, the chance of ovemtilization is minimized because the physician cannot cause
excessive ovemtilization by merely providing services. Also, this allows the physician
to provide all necessary care in an efficient manner within his or her own office.

The group practice section allows referrals within the group so long as such
referral does not decrease the quality of care offered to the patient. Forcing the group
to refer outside the group a certain percentage ofthe time will ensure that if a better

provider is available, the physician will not hesitate to refer the patiem to the better
provider. Further, if the group complies with the section by not .requiring in-group
referrals or penalties for referrals outside the group and the group offers the patient an
outside provider; the group can refer inside the group as much as it wishes. However,

the group may be audited. This section also acknowledges the difficulty in deciding
whether an outside provider is appropriate or perhaps better by allowing in-group
referrals under the circumstances outlined.
The demonstrated need section allows care to be provided by physicians receiving
income from referrals to an entity in which that physician has an ownership or

investmem interest, as long as no alternative investors exist. The proposed investors
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must identify and notify all possible alternative investors and establish that those

investors are not willing to invest on similar to or better terms than those investors that
will refer to the entity.

The most important part of the proposal is the establishment of the Fraud and

Abuse Board. The Board will function as an approval body for the numerous

arrangemems in which physicians wish to have an ownership or investment interest in
the entity to which they refer. This section allows the health care system to evolve in

any way it wishes so long as the new arrangement will not promote overutilization or
decrease quality of care. Arguably, the creation of this Board will increase

expenditures to investigate and enforce the proposal. However, the Board becomes
the sole emity responsible for self-referral issues, thereby eliminating the many
entities that currently play a role in enforcing this type of fraud and abuse. The

savings would be further enhanced if the anti-kickback laws are revised and use the
same system and Board.

The sanctions in the proposal are basically the same as in Stark, except that a
criminal provision is added. Criminal sanctions and imprisonment for the type of
violation outlined in the proposal are necessary to ensure that health care providers do
not consider attempting to work outside the proposal. Further, the type of violations

that will allow criminal sanctions are quite egregious and difficult to prove, creating a

good balance between upholding the purpose of the proposal and ensuring that
physicians are not placed in prison or worry about imprisonmem every time they make
a referral. The audit feature also ensures physician compliance.
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There are several problems with the proposal. The proposal may not

adequately protect against self-referral. The clause that allows a physician to have
investment or ownership interests as long as that interest i.s_ available to the general

public and the clause that allows compensation arrangements consistent with fair
market ;ealue may not prohibit arrangements that could lead to abuse. In addition, it

might be argued that one governing Board might not be adequate to investigate all
fraud and abuse. To be effective, the Board may have to be expansive and expensive.

Perhaps intermediary boards could carry out the tasks of the Board. However, this
may fragment and complicate the simplicity and uniformity of one central Board.

Further, defining and measuring quality of care and "no chance" of abuse may be too
difficult to be workable in determining which arrangements are prohibited.

Furthermore, the use of criminal sanctions in health care fraud and abuse enforcement
may not be appropriate and may cause a chilling effect on the creation of efficient
health care entities. Placing the burden of proof on the petitioner may create
disincentives to getting approval, thereby vitiating the usefulness of the proposal.

The author does not pretend that this proposal is the final word on how to deal
with self-referral. Rather, the proposal is meant to elicit discussion and demonstrate

that the issues of Stark may be dealt with in a much simpler manner. The proposal is
not only simpler, but also appears to prohibit self-referral, while allowing health care

to evolve and protecting quality of care. The proposal is simpler than Stark because it

deals with the evolution ofthe health care system on a case by case basis as opposed
to the current method of waiting for congressional change to the law. Further, the

proposal is not as complex as Stark because it does not suffer from the effects of
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powerful lobbying groups. In essence, a simple and efficient system to deal with
health care fraud and abuse is necessary to ensure that access to quality care is
available without causing adverse consequences to the health care market and health
care entities and professionals.

APPENDIX
42 U.S.C.

1395nn

(1) In general

Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, ff a physician (or an immediate family member of
such physician) has a financial relationship with an entity specified in paragraph (2), then-(A) the physician may not make a referral to the entity for the furnishing of designated health services
for which payment otherwise may be made under this subchapter, and
03) the entity may not present or cause to be presented a claim under this subchapter or bill to any
individual, third party payor, or other entity for designated health services furnished pursuant to a
referral prohibited under subparagraph (A).

(2) Financial relationship specified

For purposes of this section, a financial relationship of a physician (or an immediate family member of
such physician) with an entity specified in this paragraph is-(A) except as provided in subsections (c) and (d) of this section, an ownership or investment interest
in the entity, or

03) except as provided in subsection (e) of this section, a compensation arrangement (as defined in
subsection (h)(1) of this section) between the physician (or an immediate family member of such
physician) and the entity.

An ownership or investment interest described in subparagraph (A) may be through equity, debt, or
other means and includes an interest in an entity that holds an ownership or investment interest in any
entity providing the designated health service.
(b) General exceptions to both ownership and compensation arrangement prohibitions
Subsection (a)(1) of this section shall not apply in the following cases:

(1) Physicians’ services

In the case of physicians’ services (as defined in section 1395x(q) of this tifle) provided personally by
(or under the personal supervision of) another physician in the same group practice (as defined in
subsection 0a)(4) of this section) as the referring physician.

(2) In-office ancillary services

In the case of services (other than durable medical equipment (excluding infusion pumps) and
parenteral and enteral nutrients, equipment, and supplies)-(A) that are furnished-(i) personally by the referring physician, personally by a physician who is a member of the same
group practice as the referring physician, or personally by individuals who are directly supervised by
the physician or by another physician in the group practice, and
(ii)(I) in a building in which the referring physician (or another physician who is a member of the
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same group practice) furnishes physicians’ services unrelated to the furnishing of designated health
services, or

(II) in the case of a referring physician who is a member of a group practice,
which is used by the group practice--

m another building

(aa) for the provision of some or all of the group’s clinical laboratory services, or
(bb) for the centralized provision ofthe group’s designated health services (other than clinical
laboratory services),

secretary

determines other terms and conditions under which the provision of such
unless the
services does not present a risk of program or patient abuse, and

03) that are billed by the physician performing or supervising the services, by a group practice of
which such physician is a member under a billing number assigned to the group practice, or by an entity
that is wholly owned by such physician or such group practice,
if the ownership or investment interest in such services meets such other requirements as the Secretary
may impose by regulation as needed to protect against program or patient abuse.

(3) Prepaid plans

In the case of services furnished by an organization-(A) with a contract under section 1395mm of this title to an individual enrolled with the organization,
(B) described in section 13951(a)(1)(A) of this title to an individual enrolled with the organization,

(C) receiving payments on a prepaid basis, under a demonstration project under section 1395b-1 (a) of
this title or under section 222(a) ofthe Social Security Amendments of 1972, to an individual enrolled
with the organization, or

(D) that is a qualified health maintenance organization (within the meaning of section 300e-9(d) of
this title) to art individual enrolled with the organization.
(4) Other permissible exceptions

In the case of any other financial relationship which the Secretary determines, and specifies in
regulations, does not pose a risk of program or patient abuse.
(c) General exception related only to ownership or investment prohibition for ownership in publicly
traded securities and mutual funds
Ownership of the following shall not be considered to be an ownership or investment interest described
in subsection (a)(2)(A) of this section:

(1) Ownership of investment securities (including shares or bonds, debentures, notes, or other debt
instruments) which may be purchased on terms generally available to the public and which are-(A)(i) securities listed on the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange, or any
regional exchange in which quotations are published on a daily basis, or foreign securities listed on a
recognized foreign, national, or regional exchange in which quotations are published on a daily basis,
0/7
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(ii) waded under an automated interdealer quotation system operated by the National Association of
Securities Dealers, and

03) in a corporation that had, at the end of the corporation’s most recent fiscal year, or on average
during the previous 3 fiscal years, stockholder equity exceeding $75,000,000.

(2) Ownership of shares in a regulated investment company as defind in section 85 l(a) of Title 26, if
such company had, at the end ofthe company’s most recent fiscal year, or on average during the
previous 3 fiscal years, total assets exceeding $75,000,000.
(d) Additional exceptions related only to ownership or investment prohibition
The following, if not otherwise excepted under subsection (b) of this section, shall not be considered to
be an ownership or investment interest described in subsection (a)(2)(A) of this section:

(1) Hospitals in Puerto Rico

In the case of designated health services provided by a hospital located in Puerto Rico.
(2) Rural provider

In the case of designated health services furnished in a mml area (as defined in section
1395ww(d)(2)(D) of this title) by an entity, if substantially all ofthe designated health services
furnished by such entity are furnished to individuals residing in such a rural area.

(3) Hospital ownership

In the case of designated health services provided by a hospital (other than a hospital described in
paragraph (1)) if-(A) the referring physician is authorized to perform services at the hospital, and
03) the ownership or investment interest is in the hospital itself (and not merely in a subdivision of the
hospital).

(e) Exceptions relating to other compensation arrangements
The following shall not be considered to be a compensation arrangement described in subsection
(a)(2)(B) of this section:

(1) Rental of office space; rental of equipment
(A) Office space

Payments made by a lessee to a lessor for the use of premises if-(i) the lease is set out in writing, signed by the parties, and specifies the premises covered by the
lease,

(ii) the space rented or leased does not exceed that which is reasonable and necessary for the
legitimate business purposes of the lease or rental and is used exclusively by the lessee when being used
by the lessee, except that the lessee may make payments for the use of space consisting of common
areas if such payments do not exceed the lessee’s pro rata share of expenses for such space based upon
the ratio of the space used exclusively by the lessee to the total amount of space (other than common
areas) occupied by all persons using such common areas,
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(iii) the lease provides for a term of rental or lease for at least I year,
(iv) the rental charges over the term of the lease are set in advance, are consistent with fair market
value, and are not determined in a manner that takes into account the volume or value of any referrals or
other business generated between the parties,

(v) the lease would be commercially reasonable even if no referrals were made between the parties,
and

(vi) the lease meets such other requirements as the Secretary may impose by regulation as needed to
protect against program or patient abuse.

03) Equipment

Payments made by a lessee of equipment to the lessor ofthe equipment for the use of the equipment
if--

(i) the lease is set out in writing, signed by the parties, and specifies the equipment covered by the
lease,

(ii) the eqm’pment rented or leased does not exceed that which is reasonable and necessary for the
legitimate business purposes of the lease or rental and is used exclusively by the lessee when being used
by the lessee,

(iii) the lease provides for a term of rental or lease of at least I year,
(iv) the rental charges over the term of the lease are set in advance, are consistent with fair market
value, and are not determined in a manner that takes into account the volume or value of any referrals or
other business generated between the parties,

(v) the lease would be commercially reasonable even if no referrals were made between the parties,
and

(vi) the lease meets such other requirements as the Secretary may impose b regulation as needed to
protect against program or patient abuse.

(2) Bona fide employment relationships

Any amount paid by an employer to a physician (or an immediate family member of such physician)
who has a bona fide employment relationship with the employer for the provision of services if-(A) the employment is for identifiable services,
03) the amount of the remuneration under the employment-(i) is consistent with the fair market value of the services, and

(ii) is not determined in a manner that takes into account (directly or indirectly) the volume or value
of any referrals by the referring physician,

(C) the remuneration is provided pursuant to an agreement which would be commercially reasonable
even if no referrals were made to the employer, and
(D) the employment meets such other requirements as the Secretary may impose by regulation as
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needed to protect against program or patient abuse.

Subparagraph (B)(ii) shall not prohibit the payment of remuneration in the form of a productivity
bonus based on services performed personally by the physician (or an immediate family member of
such physician).

(3) Personal service arrangements
(A) In general
Remuneration from an entity under an arrangement (including remuneration for specific physicians’
services furnished to a nonprofit blood center) if--

(i) the arrangement is set out in writing, signed by the parties, and specifies the services covered by
the arrangement,
(ii) the arrangement covers all of the services to be provided by the physician (or an immediate
family member of such physician) to the entity,

(iii) the aggregate services contracted for do not exceed those that are reasonable and necessary for
the legitimate business purposes ofthe arrangement,
(iv) the term ofthe m-mngement is for at least I year,

(v) the compensation to be paid over the term of the arrangement is set in advance, does not exceed
fair market value, and except in the case of a physician incentive plan described in subparagraph 03), is
not determined in a manner that takes into account the volume or value of any referrals or other
business generated between the parties,
(vi) the services to be performed under the arrangement do not involve the counseling or promotion
or a business arrangement or other activity that violates any State or Federal law, and

(vii) the arrangement meets such other requirements as the Secretary may impose by regulation as
needed to protect against program or patient abuse.

03) Physician incentive plan exception
(i) In general

In the case of a physician incentive plan (as defined in clause (ii)) between a physician and an
entity, the compensation may be determined in a manner (through a withhold, capitation, bonus, or
otherwise) that takes into account directly or indirectly the volume or value of any referrals or other
business generated between the parties, if the plan meets the following requirements:

(I) No specific payment is made directly or indirectly under the plan to a physician or a physician
group as an inducement to reduce or limit medically necessary services provided with respect to a
specific individual enrolled with the entity.

(II) In the case of a plan that places a physician or a physician group at substantial financial risk as
determined by the Secretary pursuant to section 13 95mm(i)(8)(A)(ii) of this title, the plan complies with
any requirements the Secretary may impose pursuant to such section.

(III) Upon request by the Secretary, the entity provides the Secretary with access to descriptive
information regarding the plan, in order to permit the Secretary to determine whether the plan is in
compliance with the requirements of this clause.
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(ii) Physician incentive plan defined

For purposes of this subparagraph, the term "physician incentive plan" means any compensation
arrangement between an entity and a physician or physician group that may directly or indirectly have
the effect of reducing or limiting services provided with respect to inviduals enrolled with the entity.
(4) Remtmemtion unrelated to the provision of designated health services

In the case of remuneration which is provided by a hospital to a physician if such remuneration does
not relate to the provision of designated health services.
(5) Physician recruitment

In the case of remuneration which is provided by a hospital to a physician to reduce the physician to
relocate to the geographic area served by the hospital in order to be a member of the medical staff of the
hospital, if-(A) the physician is not required to refer patients to the hospital,
(B) the amount of the remuneration under the arrangement is not determined in a manner that takes
into account (directly or indirectly) the volume or value of any referrals by the referring physician, and

(C) the arrangement meets such other requirements as the Secretary may impose by regulation as
needed to protect against program or patient abuse.
(6) Isolated wansactions

In the case of an isolated financial transaction, such as a one-time sale of property or practice, if--

(A) the requirements described in subparagraphs 03) and (C) of paragraph (2) are met with respect to
the entity in the same manner as they apply to an employer, and

03) the transaction meets such other requirements as the Secretary may impose by regulation as
needed to protect against program or patient abuse.
(7) Certain group practice arrangements with a hospital
(A) [FN1] In general

An arrangement between a hospital and a group under which designated health services are provided
by the group but are billed by the hospital if-(i) with respect to services provided to an inpatient of the hospital, the arrangement is pursuant to the
provision of inpatient hospital services under section 1395x(b)(3) of this title,
(ii) the arrangement began before December 19, 1989, and has continued in effect without
interruption since such date,
(iii) with respect to the designated health services covered under the arrangement, substantially all of
such services furnished to patients of the hospital are filmished by the group under the arrangement,
(iv) the arrangement is pursuant to an agreement that is set out in writing and that specifies the
services to be provided by the parties and the compensation for services provided under the agreement,

62

(v) the compensation paid over the term of the agreement is consistent with fair market value and the
compensation per unit of services is fixed in advance and is not determined in a manner that takes into
account the volume or value of any referrals or other business generated between the parties,
(vi) the compensation is provided pursuant to an agreement which would be commercially reasonable
even if no referrals were made to the entity, and
(vii) the arrangement between the parties meets such other requirements as the Secretary may impose
by regulation as needed to protect against program or patient abuse.

(8) Payments by a physician for items and services

Payments made by a physician-(A) to a laboratory in exchange for the provision of clinical laboratory services, or
03) to an entity as compensation for other items or services if the items or services are furnished at a
price that is consistent with fair market value.
(f) Reporting requirements
Each entity providing covered items or services for which payment may be made under this subchapter
shall provide the Secretary with the information concerning the entity’s ownership, investment, and
compensation arrangements, including--

(1) the covered items and services provided by the entity, and
(2) the names and unique physician identification numbers of all physicians with an ownership or
investment interest (as described in subsection (a)(2)(A) of this section), or with a compensation
arrangement (as described in subsection (a)(2)(B) of this section), in the entity, or whose immediate
relatives have such an ownership or investment interest or who have such a compensation relationship
with the entity.
Such information shall be provided in such form, manner, and at such times as the Secretary shall
specify. The requirement of this subsection shall not apply to designated health services provided
outside the United States or to entities which the Secretary determines provides services for which
payment may be made under this subchapter very infrequently.

(g) Sanctions

(1) Denial of payment
No payment may be made under this subchapter for a designated health service which is provided in
violation of subsection (a)(1) of this section.
(2) Requiring refunds for certain claims
If a person collects any amounts that were billed in violation of subsection (a)(1) of this section, the
person shall be liable to the individual for, and shall refund on a timely basis to the individual, any
amounts so collected.

(3) Civil money penalty and exclusion for improper claims
Any person that presents or causes to be presented a bill or a claim for a service that such person
knows or should know is for a service for which payment may not be made under paragraph (1) or for
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which a refund has not been made under paragraph (2) shall be subject to a civil money penalty of not
more than $15,000 for each such service. The provisions of section 1320a-Ta of this title (other than the
first sentence of subsection (a) and other than subsection (b)) shall apply to a civil money penalty under
the previous sentence in the same manner as such provisions apply to a penalty or proceeding under
section 1320a-7a(a) of this rifle.

(4) Civil money penalty and exclusion for circumvention schemes

Any physician or other entity that enters into an arrangement or scheme (such as a cross-referral
arrangement) which the physician or entity knows or should know has a principal purpose of assuring
referrals by the physician to a particular entity which, if the physician directly made referrals to such
entity, would be in violation of this section, shall be subject to a civil money penalty of not more than
$100,000 for each such arrangement or scheme. The provisions of section 1320a-Ta of this title (other
than the first sentence of subsection (a) and other than subsection (b)) shall apply to a civil money
penalty under the previous sentence in the same manner as such provisions apply to a penalty or
proceeding under section 1320a-7a(a) of this title.
(5) Failure to report information

Any person who is required, but fails, to meet a reporting requirement of subsection (f) of this section
is subject to a civil money penalty of not more than $10,000 for each day for which reporting is
required to have been made. The provisions of section 1320a-7a of this title (other than the first
sentence of subsection (a) and other than subsection (b)) shall apply to a civil money penalty under the
previous sentence in the same manner as such provisions apply to a penalty or proceeding under section
1320a,7a(a) of this rifle.
(6) Advisory opinions

(A) In general
The Secretary shall issue written advisory opinions concerning whether a referral relating to
designated health services (other than clinical laboratory services) is prohibited under this section. Each
advisory opinion issued by the Secretary shall be binding as to the Secretary and the party or parties
requesting the opinion.

03) Application of certain rules
The Secretary shall, to the extent practicable, apply the nes under subsections (b)(3) and (b)(4) of
this section and take into account the regulations promulgated under subsection (b)(5) of section
1320a-7d of this title in the issuance of advisory opinions under this paragraph.

(C) Regulations

In order to implement this paragraph in a timely manner, the Secretary may promulgate regulations
that take effect on an interim basis, after notice and pending oppommity for public comment.
(D) Applicability
This paragraph shall apply to requests for advisory opinions made after the date which is 90 days after
August 5, 1997 and before the close ofthe period described in section 1320a-7d(b)(6) of this title.

(h) Definitions and special rules

For purposes of this section:
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(1) Compensation arrangement; remuneration
(A) The term "compensation arrangement" means any arrangement involving any remuneration
between a physician (or an immediate family member of such physician) and an entity other than an
arrangement involving only remuneration described in subparagraph (C).

03) The term "remuneration" includes any remuneration, directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in
cash or in kind.

(C) Remuneration described in this subparagraph is any remuneration consisting of any of the
following:
(i) The forgiveness of amounts owed for inaccurate tests or procedures, mistakenly performed tests or
procedures, or the correction of minor billing errors.

(ii) The provision of items, devices, or supplies that are used solely to--

(I) collect, transport, process, or store specimens for the entity providing the item, device, or supply,
or

(II) order or communicate the results of tests or procedures for such entity.
(iii) A payment made by an insurer or a self-insured plan to a physician to satisfy a claim, submitted
on a fee for service basis, for the furnishing of health services by that physician to an individual who is
covered by a policy with the insurer or by the self-insured plan, if--

(I) the health services are not furnished, and the payment is not made, pursuant to a contract or other
arrangement between the insurer or the plan and the physician,

(II) the payment is made to the physician on behalf of the covered individual and would otherwise
be made directly to such individual,

(III) the amount of the payment is set in advance, does not exceed fair market value, and is not
determined in a manner that takes into account directly or indirectly the volume or value of any
referrals, and
(IV) the payment meets such other requirements as the Secretary may impose by regulation as needed
to protect against program or patient abuse.

(2) Employee

An individual is considered to be "employed by" or an "employee" of an entity if the individual would
be considered to be an employee of the entity under the usual common law rules applicable in
determining the employer-employee relationship (as applied for purposes of section 312 l(d)(2) of Title
26).
(3) Fair market value
The term "fair market value" means the value in anus length transactions, consistent with the general
market value, and, with respect to rentals or leases, the value of rental property for general commercial
purposes (not taking into account its intended use) and, in the case of a lease of space, not adjusted to
reflect the additional value the prospective lessee or lessor would attribute to the proximity or
convenience to the lessor where the lessor is a potential source of patient referrals to the lessee.

(4) Group practice
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(A) Definition of group practice
The term "group practice" means a group of 2 or more physicians legally organized as a parmership,
professional corporation, foundation, not-for- profit corporation, faculty practice plan, or similar
association--

(i) in which each physician who is a member of the group provides substantially the full range of
services which the physician routinely provides, including medical care, consultation, diagnosis, or
treatment, through the joint use of shared office space, facilities, equipment and personnel,
(ii) for which substantially all ofthe services of the physicians who are members of the group are
provided through the group and are billed under a billing number assigned to the group and amounts so
received are treated as receipts ofthe group,

(iii) in which the overhead expenses of and the income from the practice are distributed in
accordance with methods previously determined,
(iv) except as provided in subparagraph (B)(i), in which no physician who is a member of the group
directly or indirectly receives compensation based on the volume or value of referrals by the physician,

(v) in which members of the group personally conduct no less than 75 percent of the
physician-patient encounters of the group practice, and
(vi) which meets such other standards as the Secretary may impose by regulation.

03) Special rules
(i) Profits and productivity bonuses

A physician in a group practice may be paid a share of overall profits of the group, or a productivity
bonus based on services personally performed or services incident to such personally performed
services, so long as the share or bonus is not determined in any manner which is directly related to the
volume or value of referrals by such physician.
(ii) Faculty practice plans

In the case of a faculty practice plan associated with a hospital, institution of higher education, or
medical school with an approved medical residency training program in which physician members may
provide a variety of different specialty services and provide professional services both within and
outside the group, as well as perform other tasks such as research, subparagraph (A) shall be applied
only with respect to the services provided within the faculty practice plan.

(5) Referral; referring physician
(A) Physicians’ services

Except as provided in subparagraph (C), in thecase of an item or service for which payment may be
made under part B, the request by a physician for the item or service, including the request by a
physician for a consultation with another physician (and any test or procedure ordered by, or to be
performed by (or under the supervision of) that other physician), constitutes a "referral" by a "referring
physician".

03) Other items
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Except as provided in subparagraph (C), the request or establishment of a plan of care by a physician
which includes the provision ofthe designated health service constitutes a "referral" by a "referring
physician".

(C) Clarification respecting certain services integral to a consultation by certain specialists

A request by a pathologist for clinical diagnostic laboratory tests and pathological examination
services, a request by a radiologist for diagnostic radiology services, and a request by a radiation
oncologist for radiation therapy, if such services are furnished by (or under the supervision of) such
pathologist, radiologist, or radiation oncologist pursuant to a consultation requested by another
physician does not constitute a "referral" by a "referring physician".
(6) Designated health services
The term "designated health services" means any of the following items or services:

(A) Clinical laboratory services.
03) Physical therapy services.

(C) Occupational therapy services.
(D) Radiology senrices, including magnetic resonance imaging, computerized axial tomogmphy
scans, and ultrasound services.
(E) Radiation therapy services and supplies.
(F) Durable medical equipment and supplies.

(G) Parenteral and enteral nutrients, equipment, and supplies.
(H) Prosthetics, orthotics, and prosthetic devices and supplies.
(I) Home health services.

(J) Outpatient prescription drugs.
(K) Inpatient and outpatient hospital services.
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